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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent Supreme Court cases have given an old issue of personal 
jurisdiction fresh pertinence. One basis of jurisdiction is the defendant’s 
consent.1  Consent has been held to exist when an out-of-state corporation 
complies with a state law requiring that it register and appoint a local 
agent for service of process.2  Jurisdiction based on consent requiring 
registering and appointing a local agent for service was recognized over a
century ago in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold
Issue Mining & Milling Company.3  Intimations of the consent by registration 
doctrine trace back to the headwaters of jurisdiction, Pennoyer v. Neff.4  This
submission to jurisdiction is, at least according to some decisions, unlimited, 
thus extending to any claim whether connected to the forum or not.5  But
because these cases predate the modern jurisdictional scheme established in
International Shoe v. Washington, their continued vitality is unsure. 
1. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703
(1982) (“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual
right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.”).
2. See Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990); 
see also Bohreer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 165 P.3d 186, 192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
3.  243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917). 
4. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735 (1878). Pennoyer explained that a state
may “require a non-resident entering into a partnership or association within its limits . . .
to appoint an agent or representative in the State to receive service of process and notice 
in legal proceedings instituted with respect to such partnership [or] association” and that
“judgments rendered upon such service” are “binding upon the non-residents both within 
and without the State.”  Id. 
5. See Pa. Fire, 243 U.S. at 94–95 (rejecting argument that Missouri’s jurisdiction 
over out-of-state corporation should be limited to “suits upon Missouri contracts”).
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The Supreme Court has created fresh limits on other bases of jurisdiction.
Like rain in a watershed, claims for jurisdiction seek other channels when old 
ways are blocked.  And as has been predicted,6 parties are dusting off the old
registration-as-consent basis of general jurisdiction.  This Article examines
whether a state may declare that an out-of-state corporation consents to 
jurisdiction over claims having no connection to the state when it registers to
do business.  I conclude that a state may assert such general jurisdiction
when it has a local plaintiff for whom it wishes to provide a forum. Other 
assertions of such general jurisdiction are bad jurisdictional policy and
pose constitutional problems. 
Part II of this Article sets the stage by laying out some basics of personal
jurisdiction and summarizing recent Supreme Court cases that have curtailed
some bases of jurisdiction.  Part III sets out the argument for general jurisdiction 
by registration, considering both its historical pedigree and modern 
jurisdictional theory.  Part IV addresses the important question of why
plaintiffs seek to sue in an unconnected forum.  What are the occasions
when general jurisdiction based on registration is attractive?  This analysis
reveals the extent to which such jurisdiction is necessary or useful.  Part
V sets out arguments against general jurisdiction based on registration,
considering both the practical problems it creates and constitutional
difficulties. Part VI provides a resolution.  It finds a limited role for this type
of general jurisdiction: a state may validly assert such jurisdiction when it
has an interest in affording a forum for a local plaintiff.
II. THE PRESENT IMPORTANCE OF CONSENT TO GENERAL JURISDICTION 
BASED ON REGISTRATION TO DO BUSINESS
General jurisdiction based on registering to do business fits within the
consent category of the current framework of personal jurisdiction.7  Consent 
to jurisdiction is a form of general jurisdiction, meaning that a consenting 
6. See generally Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 258
(2014) (“In the face of a significantly narrowed test for contacts-based general jurisdiction,
courts will be faced with new requests for consent-based general jurisdiction.”).
7. See Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the 
Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1380–82 (2015) (discussing consent-based
jurisdiction based on business registration).  But see id. at 1399 (noting that equating
registration to do business with consenting to personal jurisdiction is “faulty”).
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defendant can be sued for any claim, whether or not the claim has any
connection to the forum.8 
A. Some Basics of Personal Jurisdiction: General and Specific 
Jurisdiction 
The heads of personal jurisdiction are as follows. For an individual,
physical presence in the state accompanied by in-hand service of process 
has long sufficed to establish a court’s authority to render a valid in personam 
judgment.9  Likewise, it has long been the law that an individual is 
subject to jurisdiction in the state of his domicile,10 and a corporation is subject 
to jurisdiction in the state of its incorporation.11  Following  International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, states can subject individuals—and corporations
—to jurisdiction if they have “minimum contacts” with the state.12 Finally, 
8. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 32 (AM. L. INST. 1971) (“A state has 
power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who has consented to the exercise 
of such jurisdiction.”).
9. See Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(“Among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition 
is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present 
in the State.”).
10. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1940) (“One such incident of 
domicile is amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns without the state . . . .”);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 29 (AM. L. INST. 1971) (“A state 
has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is domiciled in the
state.”).
11. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (“[T]he place of
incorporation and principal place of business are ‘paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.’”
(quoting Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
721, 735 (1988)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (AM. L.
INST. 1971) (“A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a domestic corporation.”).
For an analysis that challenges the historicity of this commonly accepted rule, see Walter
W. Heiser, General Jurisdiction in the Place of Incorporation: An Artificial “Home” for 
an Artificial Person, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 631, 676 (2016) (“[A]fter the early nineteenth
century, there appear to be no reported decisions, federal or state, basing personal
jurisdiction solely on the fact of incorporation.”), and id. at 678 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction
based solely on the fact of incorporation is a ‘traditional’ rule with a very weak pedigree.”).
12.  326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject 
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the 
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken, 311
U.S. at 463)). International Shoe involved a corporate defendant, but its dicta extended to 
individuals. See id. at 319.  Subsequently, the Court applied the minimum contacts test to 
individual defendants. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. 
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a defendant is subject to jurisdiction if he or she consents to the forum’s
authority.13 
Modern jurisdictional theory describes two subcategories of jurisdiction:
general and specific. General jurisdiction allows a court to adjudicate
any controversy concerning the defendant regardless of the subject matter of 
the suit.14  It is “dispute-blind.”15  In contrast, a court’s authority under 
specific jurisdiction extends only to a particular dispute or controversy.16 
General jurisdiction is based on a relationship between the defendant and 
the forum of sufficient depth to allow the forum to adjudicate any claim 
involving that defendant.17  Domicile, state of incorporation, service within
13. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (“[A] party
may insist that the limitation [of personal jurisdiction] be observed, or he may forgo that
right, effectively consenting to the court’s exercise of adjudicatory authority.”); see also 4 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & ADAM N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE § 1067.3 (4th ed. 2015) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction can be based on the 
defendant’s consent to have the case adjudicated in the forum, or the defendant’s waiver 
of the personal jurisdiction defense.”).
14. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (“A 
court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim against that defendant, even if all the 
incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different State.” (citing Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 919, 919 (2011)); Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984) (“When a State exercises personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over 
the defendant.”); see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 11, at 727 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction 
establishes forum adjudicative power over any controversy involving that defendant.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 47(2) (AM. L. INST. 1971) (“A state has 
power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which does business in
the state with respect to causes of action that do not arise from the business done in the 
state if this business is so continuous and substantial as to make it reasonable for the state 
to exercise such jurisdiction.”).
15. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 613
(1988).
16. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (“Adjudicatory authority [in cases] in which the 
suit ‘arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum,’ . . .  is today called 
‘specific jurisdiction.’” (citation omitted) (first quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8;
and then quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923–24)); see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 
11, at 727 (“Specific jurisdiction . . . depends on a connection between the defendant, the 
forum, and the particular litigation.”). The original and still classic formulation of the
general-specific jurisdictional dichotomy defines specific jurisdiction as “the power
to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy
that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate.”  Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). 
17. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over
foreign . . . corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations 
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the territory of the state, and consent are examples of such a relationship.18 
Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, is narrower because the defendant has
a less profound affiliation with the forum.19  It rests instead on a particular
controversy involving the defendant having occurred in the forum.20 Specific
jurisdiction is a creature of minimum contacts jurisdiction.  When the 
defendant has relatively few contacts with the forum, but the lawsuit arises 
from or relates to those contacts, the forum has specific jurisdiction.21  But
contacts can also give rise to general jurisdiction—the ability to adjudicate any
claim against the defendant—if the defendant has enough contacts or the
right kind of contacts to create a sufficiently profound relationship to
the forum.  Thus, the pre-International Shoe landscape of jurisdiction—
domicile, transient jurisdiction, and state of incorporation —were all types
of general jurisdiction.22 Shoe added a new element to the landscape, specific
jurisdiction based on related contacts.23 
with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in 
the forum State.” (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317); von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 16, at 1136 (explaining that general jurisdiction allows a court to “exercise power to
adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or
indirect, between the forum and the person or persons whose legal rights are to be
affected”).
18. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 119, 123 (listing “in-state service of process, defendant’s domicile, appearance, 
and consent” as bases of general jurisdiction (first citing Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 
U.S. 604, 610–11 (1990); then citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940); then 
citing Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938); and then citing Nat’l Equip. Rental
v. Szukhent, 376 U.S. 311, 314(1964)); see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 11, at 733 
(stating that the state of incorporation provides a basis for general jurisdiction). 
19. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (specific jurisdiction is “a more limited form of submission to a State’s authority” 
(citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). 
20. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (“Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, 
depends on an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ principally, 
activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State . . . .” (quoting von Mehren & 
Trautman, supra note 16, at 1136)).
21. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (“‘[T]he commission of some single or occasional 
acts of the corporate agent in a state’ may sometimes be enough to subject the corporation 
to jurisdiction in that State’s tribunals with respect to suits relating to that in-state activity.”
(quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318)). 
22. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
23. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 16, at 1142 (“The formulas current 
before International Shoe Co. v. Washington emphasized consent, presence, and doing
business—concepts broad enough to ground a fully general jurisdiction . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
314
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B. Some Basics of Personal Jurisdiction: Consent 
Personal jurisdiction is an “individual right” and therefore “it can, like 
other such rights, be waived.”24  This basis of jurisdiction may be conceived
of alternatively as either a waiver of an objection to jurisdiction or a
consent to jurisdiction. Courts often use the terms consent and waiver
interchangeably.25  “Whether such surrender of a personal immunity be
conceived negatively as a waiver or positively as a consent to be sued,” 
Justice Frankfurter observed, “is merely an expression of literary
preference.”26  But in fact, one can and should distinguish between the
two. Consent is a voluntary, subjective assent to a court’s jurisdiction. 
Waiver is a consequence imposed by the law as a result of voluntarily
taking some other action.27  Although the defendant’s underlying action
was voluntary, the submission to the court’s jurisdiction may not have been.28 
Judge Learned Hand made this distinction between actual subjective consent 
and an “impute[d] result of a voluntary act” in the context of corporate
registration: 
24. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982).
25. See id. at 703 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction . . . can . . . be waived. . . . A variety of 
legal arrangements have been taken to represent express or implied consent to the personal 
jurisdiction of the court.” (emphasis added)); see also In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig.
(No. VI), 921 F.3d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 2019) (describing alternatively a decision by 
defendants to “waive” a jurisdictional defense or “consent” to jurisdiction); Innovation 
Ventures, LLC v. Nutrition Lab’ies, LLC, 912 F.3d 316, 333 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Defendants 
consented to this court’s jurisdiction so long as we found in their favor and so waived the 
objection.”); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 384 F. Supp. 3d 532, 538 (E.D. 
Pa. 2019) (framing the questions as whether a “corporation knowingly and voluntarily 
consent[s] to general jurisdiction in a state by registering to do business under a statutory 
regime that conditions the right to do business on the waiver of general jurisdiction”
(emphasis added)). 
26. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939).  The 
Court in that case was discussing venue, but the purported equivalence of waiver and
consent is equally applicable to personal jurisdiction. See id. 
27. See Monestier, supra note 7, at 1381 n.190 (“[J]urisdiction [based on] a defendant’s 
failure to follow certain procedural rules . . . is probably more aptly called ‘waiver’
or ‘estoppel’ than it is consent.”). 
28. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology
of the Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167, 1187 (2003) (drawing a distinction, in the 
context of the Eleventh Amendment, between consent based on “a state voluntarily and
knowingly agree[ing] to be sued” and waiver, which occurs when a “a state’s actions otherwise
eliminate its immunity”).
 315
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When it is said that a foreign corporation will be taken to have consented to the
appointment of an agent to accept service, the court does not mean that as a fact 
it has consented at all, because the corporation does not in fact consent; but the 
court, for purposes of justice, treats it as if it had.  It is true that the consequences so
imputed to it lie within its own control, since it need not do business within the
state, but that is not equivalent to a consent; actually it might have refused to
appoint, and yet its refusal would make no difference.  The court, in the interests of
justice, imputes results to the voluntary act of doing business within the foreign
state, quite independently of any intent.29 
Consent, as defined above, can arise in a variety of ways.  The parties 
may contractually agree in advance of any actual dispute to submit to
jurisdiction in a designated forum.30  Occasionally, parties will express 
their consent by designating a local agent to receive service of process.31 
In National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, a lease designated a local
person as an “agent for the purpose of accepting service of any process 
within the State.”32 The Supreme Court analyzed this clause as not merely 
creating a convenient vehicle for service or process, but also as consenting to
jurisdiction.33 This scheme of consenting by designating a local agent for
service has echoes in the context of registration statutes, which require
appointment of a local agent.34 
Whether the consent is expressed in plain terms or indirectly, contractual 
consent is, at least ostensibly, a wholly voluntary assent to a court’s 
jurisdiction, “represent[ing] the parties’ agreement as to the most proper 
forum.”35  The voluntariness may be understood as purely subjective36 or 
may rest on an objective rule that one signing an agreement is deemed to 
29. Smolik v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). 
30. See Atl. Mar. Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 62 (2013) (“When the 
parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection clause, a district court should ordinarily
transfer the case to the forum specified in that clause.”); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (upholding forum selection clause in cruise ticket 
contract); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (stating that forum 
selection clauses in commercial contracts are “prima facie valid and should be enforced 
unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the 
circumstances”).
31. See, e.g., Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 313 (1964). 
32. Id. 
33. See id. at 315 (“The clause was inserted by the petitioner and agreed to by the 
respondents in order to assure that any litigation under the lease should be conducted in
the State of New York.”).
34. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
35.  Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988). 
36. Some have taken the extreme position that with “forum selection clauses,
voluntary and knowing assent is impossible, regardless of the information disclosed” given 
the complexities of personal jurisdiction. Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The
Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW.
U. L. REV. 700, 730 (1992).  Under such a view, forum selections clause can be enforced only
under an objective—or fictional—notion of consent. 
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know of and assent to its terms.37  The only limitation is that the voluntariness 
of the agreement may be vitiated by resort to “traditional contract doctrines
such as ‘fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power’ . . . or
mistake, public policy, and unconscionability.”38  But assuming that a forum
selection clause is found to be voluntary, such jurisdiction is based on
a submission by the defendant to the forum. 
Consent’s sibling is waiver, which, as noted above, does not rest upon 
a subjective notion of assent.  A defendant waives any objection to jurisdiction
by appearing in the action.39  Similarly, a plaintiff waives objections to 
jurisdiction over a counterclaim by having filed its initial claim in the 
forum.40  Jurisdiction is the “price which the state may exact as the condition 
of opening its courts to the plaintiff.”41  Likewise, a defendant who fails 
to timely and properly raise a personal jurisdiction objection waives it.42 
The party in such cases may not have had a subjective desire to consent to
jurisdiction. But even if they did not, jurisdiction is found as a consequence of 
another voluntary action.  Some “actions of the defendant may amount to a
legal submission to the jurisdiction of the court,” the Supreme Court has
observed, “whether voluntary or not.”43  In this category of cases, the
jurisdiction arises not because it was the goal of the defendant, but as a
rule-imposed byproduct of the party’s other actions. 
37. See Lighthouse MGA, LLC v. First Premium Ins. Grp., 448 F. App’x 512, 515 
(5th Cir. 2011) (“[Defendant] cannot maintain that it did not knowingly and willingly
waive diversity jurisdiction on the basis that [plaintiff’s] general counsel did not discuss 
the forum selection clause with [defendant] or warn [defendant] of the clause’s existence.”). 
38. Monestier, supra note 7, at 1385–86 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972)). 
39. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703
(1982). This is a longstanding rule. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (stating
that a state has in personam jurisdiction if the defendant has made a “voluntary appearance”). 
40. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67 (1938) (“The plaintiff . . . by his voluntary
act in demanding justice from the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the 
court . . . .”).
41. Id. at 68 (citing Frank L. Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U.S. 398, 
400 (1931)).
42. See  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)–(h); 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1391 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that a defense 
for lack of personal jurisdiction is “waived if [it is] not included in a preliminary motion 
under Rule 12 as required by Rule 12(g) or, if no such motion is made, [it is] not included
in the responsive pleading or an amendment as of right to that pleading under Rule 15(a)”). 
43. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 704–05. 
 317




















    





    
     
 
  
   
 
 





C. The Contraction of Contacts-Based Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has curtailed contacts-based personal jurisdiction.44 
One may characterize these cases as contracting the previously established 
range of personal jurisdiction.45 Alternatively, one might more charitably 
view the Supreme Court as declining to ratify lower courts’ extensions of 
jurisdiction on issues that had not previously reached the Court.  But 
regardless of how one sets the baseline jurisdictional norm, it is undisputed 
that some avenues of personal jurisdiction previously available in the 
lower courts have been foreclosed.46  This contraction creates an incentive
for litigants to attempt to find alternative bases of jurisdiction. 
In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme Court reeled in a broader view of
contacts-based general jurisdiction that had held sway in the lower courts.47 
The Court there held that general jurisdiction exists only in states in which
the defendant has so many contacts that it is “essentially at home,”48 which in 
the ordinary case is limited to the corporation’s state of incorporation and its
principal place of business.49 Lower courts had previously applied a more 
generous standard of allowing general jurisdiction if the defendant’s contacts
were “continuous and systematic.”50  Under that standard, major national
retailers, such as Wal-Mart, might be subject to general jurisdiction in every
state because such businesses could be said to have “substantial and 
continuous” contacts in each state.51 
44. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–39 (2014). 
45. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 
70 FLA. L. REV. 499, 501–02 (2018) (“[T]he Roberts Court’s personal jurisdiction decisions are
changing the shape of litigation. New restrictions on jurisdiction make it harder . . . for
plaintiffs to find available courts.”).
46. See id.
 47. See Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 138–39. 
48. Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 
919 (2011)).
49. See id. at 139 n.19 (“[I]n an exceptional case . . . a corporation’s operations in
a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be 
so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.”
(citations omitted)).
50. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984); 
see Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Business of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 779 (2017) (stating that lower courts upheld 
general jurisdiction “when a defendant’s in-state contacts were continuous, systematic, 
and substantial”).
51. See Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 
1, 24 (2018) (“Prior to Goodyear, the common understanding was that companies doing 
substantial business in all fifty states—Daimler, Goodyear, Walmart, and the like—would
have been subject to general jurisdiction in every state.”); Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 
50, at 779 (explaining that general jurisdiction under the pre-Daimler standards allowed 
“Wal-Mart . . . to be subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction in all fifty states”); Tanya J.
Monestier, Where Is Home Depot “At Home”?: Daimler v. Bauman and the End of Doing 
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A few years later, the Court provided a limitation on specific jurisdiction 
in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California.52 In 
Bristol-Myers Squibb the Court limited specific jurisdiction to cases in
which there “is a connection between the forum and the specific claims at
issue.”53  In Squibb, the defendant’s nationally marketed drug had been sold
and administered in the forum to other coparty plaintiffs.54  The Supreme
Court held that despite these contacts between the defendant and coparties,
the out-of-state plaintiffs, who were prescribed and ingested the drug outside
the forum, could not sue the defendant in that state.55  This  was  also a  
narrower view than that of many of the lower courts on what sufficed for 
a “related” contact.56 
Bristol-Myers Squibb creates uncertainty for personal jurisdiction for 
class actions and other types of joinder when some claims arise from 
Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 242 (2014) (noting the possibility that “all 
large companies with a substantial presence in all fifty states—either physical or virtual—
would be subject to general jurisdiction everywhere in the United States”); Todd David 
Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and Mcintyre, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 202, 214 (2011) (“General Motors, most scholars have assumed, is subject to general 
jurisdiction in every state”.).
The case law was actually more nuanced.  Some courts held Wal-Mart to be subject to 
general jurisdiction based simply on its level of in-state activities. See, e.g., Wilgus v.
Hartz Mountain Corp., No. 3:12-CV-86 WCL, 2012 WL 2425496, at *2 (N.D. Ind. June 
26, 2012) (“Wal–Mart owns stores and conducts continuous and systematic business in 
the State of New Jersey that is sufficient to establish general jurisdiction in the State of
New Jersey.”). Other courts found that Wal-Mart’s high volume of unrelated contacts did
not create general jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Follette v. Clairol, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 840, 846
(W.D. La. 1993) (“[G]eneral jurisdiction . . . should be limited to the state of incorporation
and the state where the corporation’s principal place of business is located.”).  For a 
summary of the approaches to general jurisdiction in the lower courts, see James R. 
Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language of General
Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 982–83 (2012). 
52.  137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
53. Id. at 1781. 
54. Id. at 1775. 
55. Id. at 1781. 
56. See id.  The Court rejected the lower court’s “sliding scale approach,” which 
allowed for a looser connection between the defendant’s forum activities and the claim if
the defendant had a higher volume of contacts. Id.  Under such an approach, a claim need
not arise from or even directly relate to the defendant’s contact if the defendant had a large
number of contacts. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme,
433 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e consider the extent of the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum and the degree to which the plaintiff’s suit is related to those contacts.  A
strong showing on one axis will permit a lesser showing on the other.”). 
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defendant’s forum activities and other similar claims do not.57 It also 
furthers the pressure to find an alternative basis for general jurisdiction. 
To the extent that Bristol-Myers Squibb tightens the required nexus between
the defendant’s contacts and the claim,58 fewer cases will qualify for specific
jurisdiction and more will require general jurisdiction.  But at the same 
time, Daimler restricts contact-based general jurisdiction.  The net effect
is to lessen the breadth of contact-based jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 
Eighth Judicial District Court,59 does not eliminate the restrictions of
Bristol-Myers Squibb.  The Court in Ford Motor rejected a causal relation 
test for minimum contacts: it is not necessary that the claim arises from 
the defendant’s contacts.60  It suffices that the claim “relates to” them.61 
There is accordingly jurisdiction when the identical model of the defendant’s 
product is advertised and sold within the forum but the particular vehicle 
was manufactured, designed, and initially sold to the public outside the 
forum when a forum plaintiff is injured by it in the forum.62  This does not 
affect Bristol-Myers Squibb’s rejection of jurisdiction when the plaintiff and
his injury are not connected to the forum. 
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR CONSENT TO JURISDICTION UNDER 
REGISTRATION STATUTES
If jurisdiction cannot be justified by contacts, then one of the other 
heads of jurisdiction must be used.  Consent to jurisdiction by way of
registering to do business in a state thus beckons, and its vitality acquires 
a new urgency.63  The issue of whether a corporation consents to general 
jurisdiction by registering to do business has been percolating in the 
57. See Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 526–34. 
58. The Court failed to set out a rule in Bristol-Myers Squibb. See id. at 525.  It
held that for specific jurisdiction the defendant’s contact must be related to the claim and 
that in the case before it there was no such relationship.  See id. But it failed to explain 
what kind of relationship between contacts and plaintiff’s claim would suffice.  See id.
59.  141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021). 
60. See id. at 1026. 
61. See id.
 62. See id. 1028. 
63. See Monestier, supra note 7, at 1346 (“Plaintiffs who are now foreclosed from 
arguing continuous and systematic contacts with the forum as a basis for jurisdiction will
most likely look to registration statutes to provide the relevant hook to ground personal 
jurisdiction over corporations.”); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 6, at 259–60 (“In the 
past, the defendant’s ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts with the forum would have been
sufficient to give rise to personal jurisdiction.  Now, however, plaintiffs will be searching
for another basis on which the court can exercise general jurisdiction. . . . [T]he natural
next step for plaintiffs is to seek other grounds for general jurisdiction, and the most
obvious place to look for such consent is in a state registration filing . . . .”).
320
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lower courts for decades. Before Daimler, state and federal courts were
split over whether a registration statute created general jurisdiction.64  A
majority of states have not addressed the issue.65  After Daimler, several 
courts have revisited the issue, some holding that Daimler, or at least
Daimler’s jurisdictional policies, make such consent-based jurisdiction
improper.66  Others have concluded that general jurisdiction by reason of
registration is unaffected because Daimler addressed contacts-based
jurisdiction, not consent.67 
Before proceeding further, it is helpful to address some details: What 
do the registration statutes typically say? How have they been interpreted as
a matter of state law?  And what has the Supreme Court said about
consent via registration? 
64. See Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes, 
and General Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609, 1647
(2015) (“[S]ix states have made it clear that registration to do business results in ‘consent’ 
to general jurisdiction.” (emphasis omitted)).  Benish’s collation of the state statutes is 
very useful but is already in need of an update. Delaware previously was among the six
states that had interpreted its registration statutes as creating general jurisdiction. See
Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1113 (Del. 1988), overruled by Genuine Parts Co. v. 
Cepec, 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016); see also Benish, supra, at 1649.  But the Delaware Supreme
Court in 2016 reversed itself, holding that “we read our state’s registration statutes as 
providing a means for service of process and not as conferring general jurisdiction.”
Genuine Parts Co., 137 A.3d at 148. 
65. See Benish, supra note 64, at 1647. 
66. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 384 F. Supp. 3d 532, 545 (E.D. 
Pa. 2019) (holding that Pennsylvania’s assertion of general jurisdiction “offends the Due 
Process Clause and is unconstitutional” and prior Third Circuit case law to the contrary
“is irretrievably irreconcilable with the teachings of Daimler, and can no longer stand”); 
Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., No. 3:17-CV-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL 1942525, at *12 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 25, 2018) (“[C]onsent by registration is inconsistent with Daimler.”); Genuine Parts
Co., 137 A.3d at 148; Keeley v. Pfizer Inc., No. 4:15CV00583 ERW, 2015 WL 3999488, 
at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2015) (noting that general jurisdiction based on registration is
“contrary to the holding in Daimler that merely doing business in a state is not enough to
establish general jurisdiction” (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–39 (2014)). 
67. See Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 577 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018)
(“[B]oth International Shoe and Daimler recognized that consent presented a distinct
avenue for jurisdiction, but neither directly addressed consent by registration given that 
such a circumstance was not present in the facts of those cases.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Electrolux Home Prods., No. 5:18-CV-00699, 2018 WL 3707377, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 
2018) (“Daimler did not directly address the matter of jurisdiction by consent.”). 
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A. Illustrative Registration Statutes 
The argument for general jurisdiction under registration statutes is that 
by registering to do business in a state a corporation consents to jurisdiction 
over all claims against it in the courts of the forum.68  The consent is
extracted as a condition for doing business in the state.69  These statutes
universally require the corporation to appoint a local agent to receive
service of process.70  Appointing a local agent may itself be seen as a
form of consent: By agreeing to be amenable to service in the state, one is
submitting to the jurisdiction of the state.  But whether a corporation
consents to jurisdiction by registering and appointing an agent for service is
in the first instance a matter of state law.71  If the statute was not intended to
assert general jurisdiction or, stated differently, it was not intended to 
extract a consent to general jurisdiction by registering, then the matter is
at an end. 
Because the argument is based on an assumed demand for consent from
the state, one must start with the language and intent of the registration
statute. But the language, alas, is usually opaque.  Some examples help. 
Minnesota requires that “[e]very non-Minnesota corporation shall have a 
registered office and shall have a registered agent.”72  Further, it provides that
“[a] foreign corporation shall be subject to service of process . . . by service 
on its registered agent.”73  Upon this rather slender reed the Eighth Circuit
concluded that by registering to do business in Minnesota a corporation
68. See Monestier, supra note 7, at 1359 (“[B]y registering under the relevant state 
statute and appointing an agent for service of process, a corporation has expressly consented to
the jurisdiction of the state’s courts—period.”).
69. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction
Doctrine in A Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 393–94 (2012).
 70. See Oscar G. Chase, Consent to Judicial Jurisdiction: The Foundation of
“Registration” Statutes, 73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 159, 159 (2018); see also Monestier, 
supra note 7, at 1363, 1363 n.109 (collecting state statutes).  For a comprehensive summary of
each state’s statute, see Benish, supra note 64, at 1647 (noting that all states require as a 
part of registration the appointment of an agent). 
71. See N. Butte Mining Co. v. Tripp, 128 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1942) (stating
that because the registration “statute applied only to causes of action arising in Montana . . .
appellant’s consent to be sued in Montana did not go beyond the requirements of the 
statute”); Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 584 (D. 
Del. 2015), aff’d, 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp.
3d 648, 652 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“The law of the state determines whether a corporation
consents to the personal jurisdiction.” (citing Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites 
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704 (1982))); Lanham v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, No. 03:14-
CV-01923-HZ, 2015 WL 5167268, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 2, 2015) (“[A] court must look to 
state law to determine whether compliance with business registration or agent designation 
statutes confer general personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant.”).
72. MINN. STAT. § 303.10 (2021). 
73. Id. § 303.13. 
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submitted itself to the jurisdiction of that state.74  And the scope of
jurisdiction is unlimited.75 The “appointment of an agent for service of
process . . . gives consent to the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts for any 
cause of action, whether or not arising out of activities within the state.”76 
Compare Minnesota’s statutory language to Connecticut’s, which likewise 
requires that a “foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this
state shall continuously maintain in this state: (1) A registered office . . . ; and
(2) a registered agent at such registered office.”77  It also provides that
“[t]he registered agent of a foreign corporation authorized to transact
business in this state is the corporation’s agent for service of process,
notice or demand required or permitted by law to be served on the foreign
corporation.”78  Although the language of the two statutes is very similar,
the Second Circuit found that registering under the Connecticut statute was
not a consent to general jurisdiction.79 
Pennsylvania presents a special case due to its transparency on the
intended scope of jurisdiction.80  A foreign corporation “may not do
business . . . until it registers” in with the Pennsylvania Department of State.81 
Pennsylvania statutes then provide that the “relationship” created by the
“qualification as a foreign corporation” creates “general personal jurisdiction”
over the corporation.82  The case law under this statute has long held that
it means what it says: registering to do business is effective to create
general jurisdiction by consent.83 
74. See Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990). 
75. See id.
 76. Id.
 77. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-926(a) (2021). 
78. Id. § 33-929(a).  The language referring to service on an agent “permitted by 
law” is similar to the language found in the Model Registered Agents Act. See MODEL
REGISTERED AGENTS ACT § 13(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2011) (“A represented entity may be 
served with any process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law by serving its
registered agent.”).
79.  Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 641 (2d Cir. 2016). 
80. See Monestier, supra note 7, at 1366 (“Only one state, Pennsylvania, actually 
purports to directly address the jurisdictional consequences of registering to do business.”). 
81. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 411(a) (2021).  This statute refers to the “Department,”
which is defined elsewhere as the Department of State. See id. § 102. 
82. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301(a)(2) (2021). 
83. See Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[R]egistration by 
a foreign corporation carries with it consent to be sued in Pennsylvania courts.”); Bors v.
Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 655 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“Parties can agree to waive 
challenges to personal jurisdiction by . . . registering to do business under a statute which 
specifically advises the registrant of its consent by registration.”). 
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On the other hand, some statutes explicitly negate an argument of 
consent by registration. The Uniform Business Organizations Code has a
provision requiring registration and the appointment of an agent.84  It also 
provides, however, that “[t]he designation or maintenance in this state
of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal 
jurisdiction over the represented entity in this state.”85  Eleven states have 
adopted this provision,86 which would seem to answer in those states the 
question of jurisdiction on the basis of registration.  The only possible way
to make this provision not decisive on the question is to read it to address,
and deny, contacts-based jurisdiction but not consent.  That is, it could be
read as saying merely that that the contact of having a registered agent “does
not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction” as a matter of
counting contacts but as not addressing the separate question of consent, 
which might be satisfied by agreeing to have a local agent.87  To illustrate 
the argument, the Court in Daimler concluded that the defendant lacked 
sufficient contacts in the forum to create general jurisdiction.88  But that
does not mean the same defendant, on different facts, might not have 
consented to jurisdiction.89  Some courts have analyzed registration as a 
contact or activity separated from consent,90 but such a distinction is an 
84. See  UNIF. BUS. ORG. CODE § 1-502(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2011) (“[A foreign
corporation] may not do business in this state until it registers.”); id. § 1-402 (“[A foreign 
corporation] shall designate and maintain a registered agent.”).
85. Id. § 1-414. 
86. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-20-115 (2021); IDAHO CODE § 30-21-414 (2021); IND.
CODE § 23-0.5-4-12 (2021); ME. STAT. tit. 5, § 115 (2021); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 79-35-15
(2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-7-115 (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 77.440 (2021); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-01.1-15 (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 59-11-21 (2019); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 16-17-401 (LexisNexis 2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 23.95.460 (2021). 
87. See Monestier, supra note 7, at 1376–77. 
88. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (“It was therefore error
for the Ninth Circuit to conclude that Daimler . . . was at home in California, and hence
subject to suit there on claims by foreign plaintiffs having nothing to do with anything that 
occurred or had its principal impact in California.”). 
89. The Court in Daimler characterized the issue in cases such as the one before it 
as whether there was general jurisdiction “over a foreign corporation that has not consented to
suit in the forum.”  Id. at 129 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915, 928 (2011)). 
90. See Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (“We need not 
decide whether authorization to do business in Pennsylvania is a ‘continuous and systematic’ 
contact with the Commonwealth for purposes of the dichotomy between ‘general’ and
‘specific’ jurisdiction because such registration by a foreign corporation carries with it
consent to be sued in Pennsylvania courts.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods., 
No. 5:18-CV-00699, 2018 WL 3707377, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2018) (discussing whether 
jurisdiction based on registration is predicated on a “relationship” with the state or upon
consent). 
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unlikely reading of the statutes quoted above given that they disavow rather
than assert jurisdiction, and no court has advanced it.91 
Two last issues should be noted before leaving the statutory underpinnings
of the consent question.  First, what are the consequences of not registering?
If a corporation can painlessly flout a requirement to register, it can
simply not register and avoid the possibility of consenting to general
jurisdiction. The sanction imposed on a nonregistering corporation thus
effects the extent to which the corporation is truly coerced into submitting to
jurisdiction.  The states commonly have two sanctions for failing to register.92 
First, most states close the doors of its courts to corporations who have
failed to register.93  Commonly, this failure can be retroactively cured, enabling
a corporation to remedy its nonregistration during litigation in a court of the
state.94  Second, states frequently provide fines95 for nonregistration,
which can go as high as $10,000 per year.96  One state goes so far as to 
impose criminal liability, albeit a misdemeanor.97 
Second, what level of activity in a state triggers the duty to register?
Most states have a definition of what constitutes “doing business” in the 
state. Frequently this is done by a statutory list of activities that will not
91. In fact, the cases run in the opposite direction, eliding any distinction between 
registering as a potentially sufficient contact and registering as consent. In DeLeon v. 
BNSF Railway Co., the plaintiff argued that jurisdiction was possible even in the face of a 
statute that said registering “does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction”
because registering combined with other contacts created jurisdiction.  426 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont.
2018) (emphasis omitted) (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-7-115).  The court rejected this
contact-based argument using the language of consent: “Nothing puts a corporation on
notice that, by appointing a registered agent to receive service of process in Montana, it is 
consenting to general personal jurisdiction in Montana.” Id. (emphasis added).  The court’s
analysis is thus inconsistent with treating the statutory denial of jurisdiction as going only to a
contacts-based jurisdiction analysis. 
92. See  MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.574 (2021); see also Monestier, supra note 7, at 
1365–66; Benish, supra note 64, at 1647–61. 
93. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.574 (“A foreign corporation transacting
business in this state without a certificate of authority may not maintain a proceeding in
any court in this state until it obtains a certificate of authority.”).  For a comprehensive list,
see Benish, supra note 64, at 1647–61, and Monestier, supra note 7, at 1365–66. 
94. See Chase, supra note 70, at 169. 
95. See Monestier, supra note 7, at 1365–66 and Benish, supra note 64, at 1647– 
61 for a collection of statutory penalties. 
96. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.710 (2021). 
97. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.99 (LexisNexis 2021). 
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result in a finding of doing business.98  New York, for example, provides
the following list of activities that will not be considered doing business:
(1) Maintaining or defending any action or proceeding, whether
judicial, administrative, arbitrative or otherwise, or effecting
settlement thereof or the settlement of claims or disputes.
(2) Holding meetings of its directors or its shareholders. 
(3) Maintaining bank accounts. 
(4) Maintaining offices or agencies only for the transfer, exchange, 
and registration of its securities, or appointing and maintaining 
trustees or depositaries with relation to its securities.99 
This is similar to the approach of the Uniform Business Organizations 
Code, which lists eleven activities that do not constitute “doing business.”100 
Among them are “conducting an isolated transaction that is not in the 
course of similar transactions,” “owning, without more, property,” and
“doing business in interstate commerce.”101 Case law in New York further 
limits “doing business” to activities that are systematic, regular, and 
intrastate.102 
B. Supreme Court Case Law on General Jurisdiction by Registration 
A venerable line of Supreme Court cases supports the use of registration 
statutes to acquire jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations.  Although
these cases predate the reimagining of personal jurisdiction in International
Shoe, they have not been disclaimed by the Court and thus they support 
general jurisdiction based on registration.  Because others have ably covered 
this ground,103  this Article will only briefly highlight its most salient features.
The thread starts in 1855 with Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French.104 
The Supreme Court there held that an Ohio judgment against an Indiana
corporation was entitled to full faith and credit.105  Jurisdiction in Ohio 
had been based on a statute that provided for service upon a “resident agent” 
of the corporation in suits “founded on contracts of insurance there made 
by them with citizens of that State.”106  The Court rested jurisdiction upon 
98. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1301(b) (2021); UNIF. BUS. ORG. CODE § 1-
505(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2011).
99. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1301(b). 
100. UNIF. BUS. ORG. CODE § 1-505(a). 
101. Id. § 1-505(a)(9)–(11). 
102. Chase, supra note 70, at 171 (quoting Highfill, Inc. v. Bruce & Iris, Inc., 855 
N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)).
103. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 69, at 436–40; Chase, supra note 70, at 174–79. 
104.  59 U.S. 404 (1855). 
105. Id. at 404, 408. 
106. Id. at 406. 
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the power of a state to condition the right of a foreign corporation to
transact business in the state.107  “A corporation created by Indiana can
transact business in Ohio only with the consent, express or implied, of the 
latter State . . . [which] may be accompanied by such conditions as Ohio
may think fit to impose . . . .”108  We would today call Lafayette Insurance an
exercise of specific jurisdiction:109 The claim arose from the defendant’s
contacts with the state.  A series of subsequent cases allowed states to assert
such jurisdiction.110 
Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,111 an opinion
authored by Learned Hand, made the jump to general jurisdiction.  The 
plaintiffs in that case sued a Pennsylvania corporation that had registered
to do business in New York for injuries they suffered as employees of the 
defendant in Pennsylvania.112  Earlier cases from the Supreme Court had
forbade jurisdiction over causes of action unrelated to a corporation’s in-state
business when the defendant corporation had failed to register even though
required to by a registration statute.113  But in Smolik, the defendant had in
fact registered.114  Judge Hand concluded that actual registration led to
general jurisdiction.  The idea that a corporation consents to appointing an
agent for service over claims related to its business in the state was a “legal
fiction . . . because the corporation does not in fact consent; but the court, 
for purposes of justice, treats it as if it had.”115  But in cases where the 
corporation had actually registered, there is no need to resort to implied
consent.  “The actual consent in the cases at bar . . . must be measured by the 
proper meaning to be attributed to the words used” in the state statute.116  And 
state law in Smolik allowed a resident to “sue foreign corporations upon
any cause of action whatever.”117 Because general jurisdiction was the
price New York put on conducting business in the state, the defendant by 
registering agreed to pay it. 







Id. at 407 (citing Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839)).
See Chase, supra note 70, at 174. 
See Rhodes, supra note 69, at 436–37; Chase, supra note 70, at 174–75. 
 222 F. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). 
Benish, supra note 64, at 1635. 
See Smolik, 222 F. at 149–50. 
114. 
115. 
Benish, supra note 64, at 1635. 
Smolik, 222 F. at 151. 
116. Id.
 117. Id. at 150. 
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Smolik’s result and reasoning was soon ratified by the Supreme Court. 
In Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining &
Milling Co., an Arizona corporation sued its insurer, Pennsylvania Fire, 
for a loss on an insurance policy covering Colorado property.118  The chosen 
forum, Missouri, had no apparent connection to the dispute, but the defendant 
had registered to do business there.119  Relying on Smolik, the Supreme
Court concluded that jurisdiction existed as a result of the defendant’s 
“voluntary act” of registering, making the case indistinguishable from 
one in which the corporation by a “corporate vote . . . had accepted service in
this specific case” or had “appointed an agent authorized in terms to 
receive service.”120  Similarly, the Court in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., held that a corporation had waived venue restrictions 
by appointing a local agent for service of process.121  Venue is a privilege and
“[b]eing a privilege, it may be lost” by consent.122  Such consent may be
found in the “failure to assert [an objection] seasonably, by formal submission
in a cause, or by submission through conduct.”123  In the case of corporation
registration, the consent is “part of the bargain by which [the corporation]
enjoys the business freedom of the [s]tate.”124  Thus, the consent was a “true
contract” based on “real consent.”125 
These cases have never been disavowed by the Court.  Indeed, Smolik
was cited in International Shoe.126  Whether there is reason to now question 
them is a matter to which I shall return.127 
C. General Jurisdiction Based on Registration Comports with the 
Transactional Model of Jurisdiction 
One can identify two models of personal jurisdiction. One, what I will 
call the fiat model, rests on the power of the state.  It is unilateral so far as
the defendant and the state are concerned, although it is multilateral as 
118.  243 U.S. 93, 94 (1917). 
119. See id.
 120. Id. at 95–96 (citing N.Y., Lake Erie & W.R.R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U.S. 591 (1893)). 
121. 308 U.S. 165, 175 (1939).  The defendant objected that the suit “was not brought 
‘in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant’” as required by the
venue statute of the time.  Id. at 167 & n.1. 
122. Id. at 168. 
123. Id. at 168 (citing Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177, 179
(1929)).
124. Id. at 175. 
125. Id. (quoting Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075, 1076 
(N.Y. 1916)).
126. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318–19 (1945) (citing Smolik
v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)).
127. See infra notes 304–15 and accompanying text. 
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between the states.  The other model, which is often associated with the 
post-Shoe run of cases but which in fact has roots in Pennoyer, I will call
the transactional model.  Under this understanding of personal jurisdiction, a
state acquires the right to act against the defendant as a result of the
defendant’s placing itself within the power of the state.  This model of
jurisdiction is bilateral, the state acquiring power from the defendant’s 
conscious, volitional acts. 
The jurisdictional scheme of Pennoyer v. Neff is commonly understood to
rest on the power of the state—“naked physical power”128—over persons
and property within the borders of the state.  A state, Pennoyer explained,
“possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property 
within its territory.”129  Multilateralism under Pennoyer arises only with
respect to other states, who are protected against sister states engaging in 
jurisdictional overreach: any attempt “to enforce an ex-territorial jurisdiction . . .
would be deemed an encroachment upon the independence of the State in 
which the persons are domiciled or the property is situated, and be
resisted as usurpation.”130 But as between the state and the defendant,
the question is simply one of the authority of the state.  “The foundation 
of jurisdiction is physical power,” explained the Court about midway
between Pennoyer and Shoe.131  The Court in Shoe understood Pennoyer
this way, as it described its approach as shifting the question of jurisdiction 
away from power:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on 
their de facto power over the defendant’s person. . . . But now . . . , due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam . . . 
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’132 
Thus, after Shoe the “historical basis of in personam jurisdiction,” the
“court’s power over the defendant’s person[,] . . . was no longer the central
concern.”133 
128. See Martin H. Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: Due Process
and Constitutional Theory After Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 677 
(1991); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977) (“[U]nder Pennoyer state authority 
to adjudicate was based on the jurisdiction’s power over either persons or property.”). 
129.  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). 
130. See id. at 723. 
131.  McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). 
132. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
133. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 203. 
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Underlying the minimum contacts approach is an idea of reciprocity,
that personal jurisdiction is an exchange.  A defendant chooses to benefit 
from or affiliate with a state and in return it is subject to jurisdiction.134 
This transactional approach to jurisdiction runs through much of the modern
personal jurisdiction cases.  Personal jurisdiction is transactional between
the defendant and the state, and the role of the courts and due process, is
to provide some policing of the fairness of the bargain.135 
One sees this quite explicitly in Milliken v. Meyer,136 a case Shoe relied
on in formulating its “traditional notions of fair play” test.137 Milliken
established that domicile in a state is “sufficient to bring an absent defendant
within the reach of the state’s jurisdiction.”138  The rationale was entirely 
transactional: “The state which accords him privileges and affords protection 
to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal
duties. . . . One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the
state.”139 Shoe built on the idea of a reciprocal exchange in discussing
contacts as a basis for jurisdiction: 
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those
obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a
procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce
them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.140 
Justice Kennedy has relatively recently attempted to create a unified 
vison of jurisdiction that explains the traditional power basis in terms of 
the transactional model.141 Writing for a plurality in J. McIntyre Mach., 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, he explained that although jurisdiction is a question of
power, “[t]he Due Process Clause protects an individual’s right to be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property only by the exercise of lawful power.”142 
Power is generally lawful only when “the defendant ‘purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’”143 A defendant who
134. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
135. Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463.
 136. Id. 
137. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463); see also 
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 203. 
138. Milliken, 311 U.S. at 462. 
139. Id. at 463–64. 
140. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
141. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 879 (2011) (plurality
opinion).
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 877 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
330
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purposefully avails himself of the state’s benefits thus “submits” to its
“authority.”144  Justice Kennedy then proceeded to reconceptualize all 
of the heads of jurisdiction as instances of a consensual “submission.”145 
A fairly literal form of submission is “explicit consent.”146  And physical 
presence within the state “is another example” of submitting to the state.147 
For an individual domicile and for a corporation incorporation or principal 
place of business “also indicates general submission to a State’s powers.”148 
Finally, minimum contacts jurisdiction fits into the transactional scheme 
of submission: 
Where a defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws,’ . . . it submits to the judicial power of an otherwise foreign sovereign to the
extent that power is exercised in connection with the defendant’s activities touching
on the State.149 
Thus, the Kennedy Grand Unified Theory of Jurisdiction: “Each of these 
examples reveals circumstances, or a course of conduct, from which it is
proper to infer an intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit to 
the laws of the forum State.”150 
This may be an innovation.  But as Rocky Rhodes has pointed out, it
also rings of the political theory of John Locke, so it is perhaps instead an
atavistic reference to “a seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophical 
understanding of adjudicative jurisdiction.”151  Or perhaps it is a return 
to the true understanding of Pennoyer, which, it has been argued, was
based on Lockean political theory.152  Regardless of its pedigree, it is
a transactional model of jurisdiction, one which does have antecedents in
the language of reciprocity and of “purposefully availing” oneself state
144. Id. at 880. 
145. Id.
 146. See id.
 147. Id.
 148. Id. at 880–81 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 
U.S. 915, 924 (2011)). 
149. Id. at 881 (citation omitted) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958)).
150. Id. (emphasis added). 
151. Rhodes, supra note 69, at 417. 
152. See id. at 395; see also Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal
Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 300 (1990) (noting that Pennoyer’s jurisdictional 
rules “followed from Lockean notions of consent”). 
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benefits and thereby incurring a jurisdictional debt.153 And it is not just
Justice Kennedy off on a frolic.  In Daimler AG v. Bauman, Justice
Ginsberg, in an opinion joined by seven Justices, criticized overly broad
general jurisdiction on the ground that it would fail to “permit out-of-state 
defendants ‘to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance 
as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.’”154 
Nor is the idea that a defendant should be able to decide where to be subject
to jurisdiction by structuring its conduct recently coined.  Its pedigree runs
to nearly forty years, having first appeared in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson.155 
The argument for general jurisdiction based on registration is strengthened if
personal jurisdiction is fundamentally a transaction between the defendant
and the state.  Contacts-based jurisdiction under this model is somewhat 
fictive.  The defendant will be regarded as having placed itself within the
state’s ambit by activities in the state whether or not the defendant actually so
intended. In contrast, basing jurisdiction on a voluntary act of registering
with the state in exchange for the privilege of conducting business in the 
state requires no metaphorical reasoning.  The defendant literally submitted 
to the state. And under general jurisdiction based on registration, the 
Supreme Court is relieved of the difficult burden of policing the fairness 
of the transactional bargain as it must in minimum contacts cases.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE REGISTRATION CASES
Merely because the law allows a plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction over
a defendant in a particular state does not make a suit there likely.  Under
minimum contacts, the state in which the defendant has purposeful contacts
that are related to the litigation will always have jurisdiction.156  Because
153. See Kogan, supra note 152, at 363–64. 
154. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119, 139 (2014) (quoting Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). 
155. See 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
156. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 
(2011) (“[T]he commission of certain ‘single or occasional acts’ in a State may be 
sufficient to render a corporation answerable in that State with respect to those acts, though
not with respect to matters unrelated to the forum connections.” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945))); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472–73 (stating that 
due process is “satisfied if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at 
residents of the forum. . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of
or relate to’ those activities” (citation omitted) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 774 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
414 (1984))); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two Profiles for Specific
Jurisdiction, 38 IND. L. REV. 343, 346 (2005) (“[I]f a defendant has one or more contacts 
with a state, the state may be able to subject the defendant to jurisdiction for suits arising
out of or relating to the forum state contacts.” (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17)). 
332
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litigation-related events happened in that state, litigation there would generally 
be convenient.  So why would a plaintiff seek to sue a defendant elsewhere,
in a state unrelated to the events of the case under a consent by registration 
theory? Who are the plaintiffs attempting to take advantage of general 
jurisdiction by registration and what are their motives? 
Cases relying on registration for jurisdiction fall into several categories. In
some cases, the facts or procedural history reveal that the plaintiff is
attempting to take advantage of jurisdiction by registration in order to 
shop for an advantageous forum.157  In other cases, there is no affirmative
record of forum shopping, but neither is there any apparent reason related to
convenience for the choice of the forum.158  In such cases one can only
assume that forum shopping is the motivation.  On the other hand, some 
cases reveal a convenience-related reason for the plaintiff to sue in the
forum.159 These cases often involve a forum that is connected to and
convenient for the plaintiff but is unconnected to the defendant. 
Before discussing this further, a few words are necessary about forum 
shopping. In ordinary usage, forum shopping is a term of derision.160 
“[C]ounsel, judges, and academicians employ the term ‘forum shopping’ 
to reproach a litigant who, in their opinion, unfairly exploits jurisdictional or 
venue rules to affect the outcome of a lawsuit.”161  But much hangs on the
word “unfairly.”  In every case the plaintiff has made an initial choice about
where to sue, and forum shopping is in that sense necessary, ubiquitous, and
157. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519–21 (1990) (describing how 
plaintiffs purposely filed suits in multiple forums to take advantage of differing statute of 
limitations before transfer all the suits to their home state).
158. See, e.g., Keeley v. Pfizer Inc., No. 4:15CV00583 ERW, 2015 WL 3999488, at 
*3 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2015) (“[N]o facts suggest[] Plaintiff was prescribed the medication . . .,
purchased the medication . . ., saw the advertisements . . . or in any way was injured in
[the forum].”). 
159. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918 (noting that plaintiff filed suit in their home state 
of North Carolina, but the cause of action and defendants were based in Europe).
160. See Hamilton v. Roth, 624 F.2d 1204, 1210 n.6 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he primary
evil of forum shopping . . . results whenever a plaintiff has the ability to choose between 
state and federal fora, and can obtain more favorable result in federal court.”); Torres v.
S.S. Rosario, 125 F. Supp. 496, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1404,
providing for transfers within the federal system, was designed to “remedy the evils of 
forum shopping” (citing Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 (1949))). 
161. Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 553, 553 (1989). 
 333
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unexceptionable.162  When one uses the term “forum shopping” derisively, 
there is an unstated premise that a litigant should be allowed to choose a
forum only for certain reasons and that other motives are proscribed.
Plaintiffs choosing to sue in their own home state, for example, are not
regarded as forum shopping in the bad sense although the forum selected
is of course a product of a plaintiff’s choice.  “Where there are only two 
parties to a dispute, there is good reason why it should be tried in the 
plaintiff’s home forum if that has been his choice.”163 But a plaintiff suing in
an otherwise unconnected forum to take advantage of favorable substantive 
law is seen as improper, indeed “evil” forum shopping.164  There is a
sense in these cases that the plaintiffs are taking something to which they
are not entitled—even though jurisdiction is proper—that they are not
merely forum shopping, but, we might say, forum shoplifting. Preventing
this kind of forum shopping in the state versus federal court context is one
to the “twin aims” of the Erie doctrine.165  And in the state-to-state forum
shopping context, one of the main goals of choice of law doctrine is to
advance the “[p]redictability and uniformity of result” in order that “forum
shopping will be discouraged.”166  On the other hand, a plaintiff selecting a
forum based on favorable forum procedural law is generally not criticized for 
162. See In re Schlotzsky’s, Inc., 351 B.R. 430, 435 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) (“All 
plaintiffs who have a choice of forums in which to bring litigation engage in de facto 
‘forum shopping’ as soon as they pick one available forum over the other.”). 
163. Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947); see also
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981) (“[A] plaintiff’s choice of forum is 
entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen the home forum.” (citing Koster, 
330 U.S. at 524)); Sun Pharm. Indus., Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 07-CV-15087, 2008 WL 
1902111, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2008) (“[P]laintiff forum shopping is not an evil to 
be avoided, but rather is an inherent part of our federal court network.  A plaintiff may 
have available numerous places of equal convenience to bring his or her suit, and has every 
right to file in the forum that is most geographically convenient . . . . .”).
164. See Walters v. Inexco Oil Co., 440 So. 2d 268, 276 (Miss. 1983). 
We refer to the forum shopping evil.  By forum shopping we refer to the situation
where an action would lie within the subject matter jurisdiction of both federal
and state trial court and where there may be differences in the law applied in
each court which may affect the plaintiff’s decision where to file—and which
may produce differing final results, depending upon which court is selected. 
Id.
165.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. i (AM. L. INST. 1971). 
334
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illegitimate forum shopping.167 Although this is a large topic168—larger than
I wish to completely assay here—I will offer the following working definition 
of forum shopping, which is of sufficient precision for our purposes:
Illegitimate forum shopping is a choice of forum for no reason relating to 
litigational convenience.169 I will call this “invidious” forum shopping.170  If
the plaintiff could be imagined to have chosen the same forum absent any 
advantage in the substantive law applied, choosing the forum instead, for 
example, on the basis of the location of evidence or procedural advantages of
the forum, then we should not be troubled by forum shopping.
A. Invidious Forum Shopping
DeLeon v. BNSF Railway Company171 serves as an example of those
cases asserting general jurisdiction based on registration in an attempt at 
invidious forum shopping.  Three plaintiffs sued their employer, a railroad, 
in Montana for injuries occurring in other states.172  The plaintiffs were
from Missouri and Texas, and the defendant was a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Texas.173  The plaintiffs argued for
jurisdiction based on the defendant’s registering to do business in the 
state.174  Why, one may wonder, would these plaintiffs go to the trouble
of seeking jurisdiction in Montana, given that they, the defendant, and
167. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 
416 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[D]ivergence from state law, with the attendant
consequence of forum shopping, is the inevitable (indeed, one might say the intended)
result of a uniform system of federal procedure.”); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“[L]itigants often choose a federal forum merely to obtain what they consider 
the advantages of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum 
Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 362–63 (2006) (“Erie and Hanna did not criticize (much less 
prohibit) forum shopping as between . . . differences in procedural provisions.”).
168. See generally Bassett, supra note 167, for a discussion and typology of forum 
shopping.
169. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (plurality 
opinion) (rejecting personal jurisdiction in part because the party asserting jurisdiction had 
“not demonstrated that it is more convenient for it to litigate its indemnification claim” in 
the forum as opposed to other possible forums). 
170. For other commentators’ use of this term, see 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:7 (4th ed. 2013), and Justin R. Long, Against 
Certification, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 119 (2009). 
171. 
172. 
 DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., 426 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2018). 
Id. at 3. 
173. Id. at 4. 
174. See id.
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the underlying events had no connection to Montana?  The answer is that 
for a time Montana had become catnip to Federal Employers’ Liability 
Act (FELA) plaintiffs.175  A similar attempt at jurisdictional overreaching 
occurred in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell.176  As in DeLeon, the plaintiffs
and the underlying events were unconnected to Montana.177  The Supreme 
Court had already decided in Daimler AG v. Bauman178 that general
jurisdiction based on a high volume of contacts is limited to a corporation’s 
state of incorporation and its principal place of business.179 The Montana
Supreme Court thought Daimler did not apply to railroad defendants in
FELA cases.180  The United States Supreme Court clarified that Daimler
did apply and held that general jurisdiction was not satisfied despite the
defendant’s thousands of miles of tracks and thousands of employees in
the state.181  But why sue in Montana of all places?  The answer is found 
in the brief for the defendant railroad:
Once a complaint is timely filed within the applicable statute of limitations,
Montana gives plaintiffs up to three additional years to serve the complaint on
the defendant. . . . Montana does not require discovery to be proportional to the 
needs of the case. . . . The Montana Supreme Court refuses to allow motions to
transfer FELA cases based on forum non conveniens. . . . Montana generally does 
not follow the standards for expert witnesses in Daubert . . . . Montana requires
only two-thirds of a jury to agree on a verdict. . . . The Montana Supreme Court
has . . . interpreted FELA’s statutory three-year statute of limitations to allow 
plaintiffs to recover for the full amount of their injuries so long as, sometime in
the past three years, the defendant’s alleged negligence contributed in any way 
(however slight) to the injury. . . . Whereas railroad defendants in other courts are
entitled to seek have their FELA liability apportioned to account for a plaintiff’s
preexisting conditions, . . . the Montana Supreme Court has strongly suggested
that railroads cannot make this defense. . . . [T]he Montana Supreme Court has
approved—and held that FELA does not preempt—novel independent causes of
action against railroads . . . . 
Given this extraordinary combination of plaintiff-friendly procedural rules, legal 
standards, and case outcomes, it is unsurprising that BNSF has recently faced 36
FELA lawsuits in Montana state court that have no connection whatsoever to
Montana.182 
175. See, e.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558–59 (2017). 
176. Id.
 177. See id. at 1554 (“[N]either [plaintiff] appears ever to have worked for BNSF in 
Montana.”).
178.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
179. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
180. See Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. at 1554–55. 
181. See id. at 1558–59. 
182. Brief for Petitioner at 10–13, Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (No. 16-405) (original
emphasis omitted) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first citing Mont. R. Civ. P.
4(t)(1); then citing State ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dist. Ct., 891 P.2d 493, 499
336
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Other cases asserting jurisdiction on the basis of registration are less
compelling but are still suggestive of invidious forum shopping.  In 
Keeley v. Pfizer Inc., a mother and son sued in Missouri for the son’s
birth defects allegedly caused by the mother’s ingesting the defendant’s 
prescription drug while pregnant.183  The plaintiffs failed in their efforts
to convince the court to assert general jurisdiction.184  There was no obvious
reason for the case to be filed in Missouri: “it is unclear how Defendant’s 
contacts with Missouri relate to the cause of action in this suit.”185  The
plaintiff son “was born in Georgia” and “no facts suggest[] Plaintiff was 
prescribed the medication in Missouri, purchased the medication in Missouri, 
saw the advertisements in Missouri, or in any way was injured in
Missouri.”186  Thus, invidious forum shopping seems the likely motive for 
choosing the forum.  Similarly, no reason of convenience appeared to 
motivate the plaintiffs choice of forum in AM Trust v. UBS AG.187  The
plaintiff was a “Bahamian trust whose beneficiaries are the heirs of a
deceased Indonesian government official [who] filed a purported class
action in the Northern District of California . . . against UBS, a Swiss 
bank.”188  The only apparent connection of California to the matter was a 
vague reference in the complaint that “some” unidentified members of the
“class reside in California.”189  The court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt at
using general jurisdiction based on registration.190 
B. Capturing a Longer Statute of Limitations 
Other cases present a plaintiff choosing a forum with perhaps more
defensible motives.  In Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the plaintiff sued
for asbestos exposure.191  He had been a mechanic in the Air Force and 
alleged exposure at his work “at various bases in Europe and in the United
(Mont. 1995); then citing Mont R. Civ. P. 48; and then citing Winslow v. Mont. Rail Link, 
16 P.3d 992, 995–96 (Mont. 2000)). 
183.  No. 4:15CV00583 ERW, 2015 WL 3999488, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2015). 
184. See id. at *4. 
185. Id. at *3. 
186. Id.
187.  AM Tr. v. UBS AG, 681 F. App’x 587 (9th Cir. 2017) (mem.). 
188. Id. at 588. 
189. AM Tr. v. UBS AG, 78 F. Supp. 3d 977, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d 681 F. 
App’x 587 (9th Cir. 2017). 
190. AM Tr., 681 F. App’x at 588–89. 
191.  Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 622 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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States (i.e., in Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, New Mexico, and
Michigan).”192 He originally sued Lockheed in his home state of Alabama,
but voluntarily dismissed in the face of a statute of limitations defense.193 
He then brought the action in Connecticut, asserting general jurisdiction 
based on registration.194  Thus, the choice of forum was entirely driven by
the availability of a longer statute of limitations.195  Similarly, the statute
of limitations drove the choice of forum in Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, 
Inc.196  The plaintiff was injured while driving through Iowa from her then
home in Minnesota en route to Colorado.197  By the time she filed suit, she
had moved from Minnesota to Colorado.198  Rather than sue in Iowa, the
place of the accident, or Colorado, her new home, she sued in Minnesota 
arguing for general jurisdiction based on registration.199  Why Minnesota?
Because the statute of limitations.200  The Minnesota district court ruled 
that it lacked personal jurisdiction and in lieu of a dismissal transferred 
the case to the Southern District of Iowa.201  That court dismissed the case
on the basis of Iowa’s statute of limitations.202  The action was timely 
under Minnesota law,203 which is no doubt the reason plaintiff chose that
forum. 
Is an effort to find a longer statute of limitations in an unconnected state 
an instance of invidious forum shopping, or is it a case of a plaintiff 
legitimately taking advantage of a forum’s favorable procedure?  The 
resolution to this question depends on whether one views the statute of 
limitations as a mere procedure or as substantive, a hoary old problem.204 
On the one hand, the traditional characterization of a statute of limitations 
for horizontal choice of law purposes is that it is “procedural and thus may 
be governed by forum law even when the substance of the claim must be 
governed by another State’s law.”205 On the other hand, this result was 
192. Id. at 623. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 623–24. 
195. Id. at 623 n.3. 
196. 
197. 
 900 F.2d 1196, 1197 (8th Cir. 1990). 
Id.
 198. Id. at 1198. 
199. Id.
 200. See id. at 1197. 
201. Id.
 202. Id. at 1198. 
203. Id. at 1197. 
204. See, e.g., Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 107–08 (1945) (asking whether in
a diversity case a statute of limitations “a matter of ‘substantive rights’ . . . or is such
statute of ‘a mere remedial character’ . . . which a federal court may disregard?” (citation
omitted) (quoting Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford Cnty., 281 U.S. 121, 128 (1930))). 
205. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988); see also Bournias v. Atl. 
Mar. Co., 220 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1955) (“[F]or the purpose of deciding whether to
338
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criticized206 and so a Uniform Law proposed to flip the characterization 
of statutes of limitations from procedural to substantive.207  The Second 
Restatement of Conflicts here follows its usual, unhelpful pattern of giving
an apparently precise rule whose clarity is undermined by making its 
application dependent on an impossibly abstruse concept: “An action will
not be entertained in another state if it is barred in the state of the otherwise 
applicable law by a statute of limitations which bars the right and not merely 
the remedy.”208  Thus, there is a rule—apply the law of the state whose
substantive law governs—with an exception turning on the inscrutable 
distinction of whether the foreign law “bars the right” as opposed to
merely the “remedy.”209  Finally, many states have borrowing statutes,
providing that a cause of action is barred in the courts of the state if barred
under the law of the state where the cause of action arose.210 
C. Facilitating Joinder of Defendants 
In In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI)211 the forum
appears to have been chosen in an effort to sue all defendants in one
proceeding. The plaintiff brought an asbestos claim alleging that her late
husband had been exposed to asbestos while serving in the Navy.212  Plaintiff
sued in Pennsylvania, but both she and the defendant were Virginia citizens,
apply local law or foreign law, statutes of limitations are classified as ‘procedural.’” (citing
GEORGE WILFRED STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 147 (1951); Comment, 
The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L.J. 492 (1919));
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 604 (AM. L. INST. 1934) (“If action is not
barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, an action can be maintained, though action 
is barred in the state where the cause of action arose.”).
206. See Bournias, 220 F.2d at 154. 
207. See  UNIF. CONFLICT OF LAWS-LIMITATIONS ACT § 2 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1982)
(“[I]f a claim is substantively based . . . upon the law of one other state, the limitation
period of that state applies.”). 
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 143 (AM. L. INST. 1971).
209. Id.
 210. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5521(b) (2020) (“The period of limitation
applicable to a claim accruing outside this Commonwealth shall be either that provided or
prescribed by the law of the place where the claim accrued or by the law of this
Commonwealth, whichever first bars the claim.”).  See generally Francis M. Dougherty, 
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application, in Nonstatutory Personal Injury Actions,
of State Statute Providing for Borrowing of Statute of Limitations of Another State, 41
A.L.R. 4th 1025 (2020). 
211.  384 F. Supp. 3d 532 (E.D. Pa. 2019). 
212. Id. at 534–35. 
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and the exposure to the defendant’s product occurred outside Pennsylvania.213 
The plaintiff argued for general jurisdiction on the basis of registration.214 
On these facts, the absence of any Pennsylvania connection produces an
odor of forum shopping.  But plaintiff chose Pennsylvania for some reason. 
Why?  Several facts are suggestive. The plaintiff sued a total of forty-eight 
defendants.215  The defendant moving to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction had
no Pennsylvania connection to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff did allege that
the decedent “was exposed to asbestos in Pennsylvania,” albeit “it was not 
asbestos for which [the defendant in question] could be responsible.”216 
So, reading between the lines, the plaintiff sued one or more defendants in
Pennsylvania who did have some litigation-related Pennsylvania contacts 
making that forum a convenient and logical place to sue. The plaintiff
additionally wanted to join another defendant who lacked such contacts.217 
The problem for the plaintiff was one of personal jurisdiction barriers to
defendant joinder.218  Jurisdictional doctrine requires that each defendant 
be subject to jurisdiction.219  When a plaintiff has claims against one defendant 
arising in one state and against another defendant arising in a different 
state, obtaining personal jurisdiction over both defendants in a single state 
will be difficult.220  Under the pre-Daimler broad conception of general
jurisdiction, large corporations could be sued in every state in which they 
did substantial business, and it would be relatively easy for the plaintiff to
find an overlap state, one in which all defendants were subject to general 
jurisdiction.221  But now that contacts-based general jurisdiction is limited 
to a defendant’s state of incorporation and its principal place of business,
finding a state in which all defendants are “at home” in the Daimler sense
is harder.222  General jurisdiction by registration is thus attractive as an
alternative. It is understandable why plaintiff should wish to sue all defendants 
213. Id. at 535. 
214. Id.
 215. Id. at 534. 
216. Id. at 535 n.4. 
217. Id. at 534–35. 
218. For a discussion of the problems of personal jurisdiction and defendant joinder, 
see Dodson, supra note 51, at 32–34. 
219. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (“Each defendant’s contacts with 
the forum State must be assessed individually.”); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 
(1980) (noting that International Shoe’s test “must be met as to each defendant over whom 
a state court exercises jurisdiction”).
220. See Dodson, supra note 51, at 32–34. 
221. See Monestier, supra note 51, at 242. 
222. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.19 (2014). 
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in one forum.223  Plaintiff’s apparent motive is litigational convenience,
not shopping for favorable law. 
The desire to join multiple defendants was likewise the apparent motive 
for invoking general jurisdiction based on registration in Genuine Parts 
Co. v. Cepec.224 Cepec was an asbestos case brought in Delaware by a
Georgia husband and wife based on exposure to asbestos at the husband’s
place of work in Florida.225  Five of the seven defendants were Delaware
corporations.226  The desire to sue as many defendants as possible in one
forum explains the choice of Delaware as the forum despite its lack of
connection to the plaintiffs or the underlying events. But one of the defendants, 
Genuine Parts, was a Georgia corporation with its principal place of 
business in that state.227  Thus, Delaware had no specific jurisdiction over 
Genuine Parts because the events giving rise to the claim occurred wholly 
out of the state and no contacts-based general jurisdiction existed under 
Daimler.228  The plaintiff’s remaining option was to rest jurisdiction on 
registration.229 
D. Facilitating Joinder of Plaintiffs and of Plaintiff’s Claims 
The joinder problems underlying Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 
Court of California230 present another motive for asserting general jurisdiction
based on registration.231  Under Squibb, every plaintiff’s claim must arise
from the defendant’s contacts with the state; it is not enough that other
plaintiffs have identical claims that did arise in the state.232  As Justice 
Alito put it, “what is missing here . . . is a connection between the forum 
223. Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1789 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“What interests are served by preventing the consolidation of
claims and limiting the forums in which they can be consolidated?”). 
Goodyear and Daimler, we read our state’s registration statutes as providing a means for
224. 
225. 
 137 A.3d 123, 128–29 (Del. 2016). 
Id. at 128. 
226. Id.
 227. Id.
 228. Id. at 148. 
229. See id. at 128–29.  The court rejected the argument. Id. at 148 (“In light of . . . 
service of process and not as conferring general jurisdiction.”). 
230.  137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
231. On the problems that Squibb creates for claim joinder by plaintiffs and party 
joinder of plaintiffs, see Dodson, supra note 51, at 28–32. 
232. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
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and the specific claims at issue,”233 and what he meant by “specific claims 
at issue” are the claims of the particular plaintiff who is asserting jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction is thus party-specific, not merely transaction-specific: For a 
given course of conduct carried on across states, whether a defendant is
subject to jurisdiction depends upon the identity of the plaintiff.  But given 
the attractions of plaintiff joinder,234 it is not surprising that plaintiffs
would seek to join together claims against a single defendant in one forum.
These limitations created by Squibb are illustrated by Perez v. Air and 
Liquid Systems Corporation.235  The plaintiff in that case alleged that her 
late husband had been exposed to asbestos during Navy service while 
serving in California and Hawaii.236  She sued General Electric, a New
York corporation with its principal place of business in Massachusetts, in 
Illinois.237  General Electric moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.238 
The court rejected the argument that “specific jurisdiction exist[ed] because
the ‘Illinois residents’ claims and nonresident plaintiffs’ claims, including
Plaintiff’s claims here, are based on the same defective asbestos-containing
products, which caused injuries both in and out of Illinois.’”239  Because
specific jurisdiction thus failed, the plaintiff was left to argue, unsuccessfully, 
for general jurisdiction based on registration.240 
Horowitz v. AT&T Inc.241  is another instance of attempting to use general
jurisdiction based on registration to achieve the joinder of multiple plaintiffs
in one suit. In that case, several named plaintiffs brought a putative class 
233. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
234. See Dodson, supra note 51, at 8 (“Aggregating plaintiffs offers them the opportunity
to reduce costs in a way that can make meritorious but otherwise economically nonviable 
litigation viable, offers defendants the opportunity for mass resolution, . . . and furthers
private enforcement of compliance with substantive law.”).
235. Perez v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 3:16-CV-00842-NJR-DGW, 2016 WL 
7049153 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2016). 
is not a multi-plaintiff case where some plaintiffs were injured in Illinois and others were
236. Id. at *5. 
237. Id. at *3. 
238. Id.
 239. Id. at *5. 
240. Id. at *6–9.  In fact, there were no local co-plaintiffs in Perez. Id. at *6 (“This 
not.”). Why the case was filed in Illinois is unclear.  The plaintiff was from California.
Notice of Removal at 6, Perez, 2016 WL 7049153 (No. 3:16-CV-00842).  The docket 
contains a PDF of the Notice of Removal from state court, which includes as an attachment 
the plaintiff’s state court complaint. See id.  That complaint lists her address as “Vista,
CA” and attaches a copy of her husband’s California death certificate. Id.  One possible
reason for suing in Illinois is that one of the defendants, John Crane, Inc., was an Illinois 
corporation. Id. at 5.  If that is true, then this would be an instance of attempting to use 
general jurisdiction based on registration to achieve the joinder of defendants from 
different states. One might wonder, however, why Illinois was selected, as opposed to the 
home states of the other defendants such as G.E.
241.  No. 3:17-CV-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL 1942525 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2018). 
342
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action alleging age discrimination in employment claims in New Jersey 
federal court.242  Although three of the named plaintiffs lived and had been
employed by the defendant in New Jersey, two others lived and had worked
in other states.243  Under Squibb, specific jurisdiction failed because “there
must be a connection between [these plaintiffs’] claims” and the defendants’ 
“activities within New Jersey, even if [these plaintiffs’] claims are similar
or identical to claims brought by the resident named plaintiffs.”244  With 
specific jurisdiction thus foreclosed, the plaintiffs argued, unsuccessfully, 
for general jurisdiction based on registration.245 
The desire by a single plaintiff to join claims against a single defendant 
that occurred in many states presents another occasion for attempts to use
general jurisdiction based on registration.  In Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Electrolux Home Products, Allstate, an Illinois corporation with its principal 
place of business in that state, sued Electrolux, a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in North Carolina, seeking to recover 
amounts Allstate had paid out in insurance claims due to fires caused by
Electrolux dryers.246  The fires occurred in “eighty-six separate instances
occurring across twenty-one states.”247  According to Electrolux, of the eighty-
six fires, only fourteen occurred in Pennsylvania, with the remaining seventy- 
two having occurred in twenty other states.248  The court observed that the
reasons for Allstate’s choice forum “are not apparent.”249  But because some
of the fires were local to Pennsylvania, it would one logical place to sue,
albeit not the only one.  The desire to join the claims is understandable. 
But if that were the only motivating factor in forum selection, North 
Carolina, the defendant’s principal place of business, would suffice.  Perhaps
the plaintiff was seeking a single forum for all of its claims without giving 
the defendant a homecourt advantage.  Why Pennsylvania?  Perhaps exactly 
242. 
243. 
Id. at *1, *15–16 (discussing class allegations).
Id. at *1–2. 
244. Id. at *15. 
245. Id. at *11–12. 
246. 
247. 
 No. 5:18-CV-00699, 2018 WL 3707377, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2018). 
Id.
248. Defendant Electrolux Home Products, Inc.’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or, in the Alternative, Sever and Dismiss for 
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 4, Allstate Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3707377 (No. 5:18-
CV-00699).
249. Allstate Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3707377, at *8. 
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because of its uniquely broad statutory assertion of general jurisdiction 
based on registration.250 
E. Peripatetic Plaintiffs and Peregrinating Products 
Finally, there are cases in which the plaintiff seeks to use general 
jurisdiction based on registration in order to sue in plaintiff’s home state.
In these cases, the defendant is not subject to specific jurisdiction in the
plaintiff’s home state because it has no contacts there.  Some of these cases
simply involve a plaintiff who travels from home, is injured, then returns 
home and wishes to sue there.251  In Lanham v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC, 
a truck driver who resided in Oregon tripped and fell while at defendant’s 
Idaho truck stop.252  He sought to sue in his home state.  Although the 
defendant operated truck stops throughout the United States,253 the accident
did not involve anything it did in Oregon, so there was no basis for specific 
jurisdiction.254  The plaintiff thus had to rely on general jurisdiction based 
on registration.255  In other cases, the plaintiff previously lived in another 
state and was injured or exposed to a toxic substance there.256  After moving
to another state, the plaintiff sought to sue in his new home forum.257 
Gorton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp.258 is an example.  The plaintiffs brought 
an asbestos case in Pennsylvania for injuries that manifested in Pennsylvania,259 
the plaintiff’s home state.260  But the plaintiff’s exposure had occurred years
earlier while he had been employed in other states.261  Because his claim
was not based on defendants’ in-state activities, he had to rely on general 
jurisdiction based on registration.262 
250. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
251. See, e.g., Lanham v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC, No. 03:14-CV-01923-HZ, 2015 
WL 5167268 (D. Or. Sept. 2, 2015). 
Pa. 2018). 
252. Id. at *1. 
253. Id.
 254. Id. at *4. 
255. Id.
 256. See, e.g., Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 288 (M.D. 
257. See id.
 258. Id. 
259. Id. at 292. 
260. Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Pacific Bell 
Tel. Co., Nev. Bell Tel. Co., and AT&T, Inc. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for 
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction at 1, Gorton, 303 F. Supp. 3d 278 (No. 1:17-CV-01110-YK)
(“Mr. Gorton was a resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at the time that his 
symptoms began to manifest themselves.”).
261. Gorton, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 288. 
262. Id. at 295, 297. 
344
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Also in the category of plaintiffs using registration-based jurisdiction in 
an attempt to sue at home are those where the defendant lacks minimum 
contacts because the product, not the plaintiff, traveled.263  In these cases, 
the product came to the plaintiff in the plaintiff’s home state but was not 
directly marketed there by the defendant.264  In Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 
a Pennsylvania plaintiff sued Johnson & Johnson in Pennsylvania, alleging
that she was injured by its baby powder, which contained talc manufactured
by Imerys, an out-of-state, defendant.265  Because plaintiff, per her allegations,
“purchased and used Johnson & Johnson baby powder in Pennsylvania,”266 
Johnson & Johnson would appear to be subject to specific jurisdiction 
there because its advertising would satisfy the most rigorous tests of stream 
of commerce jurisdiction, “targeting” the forum, as is required by a plurality in
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,267 or taking actions showing an
intent to serve the market in that state, as is required by a plurality in Asahi 
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California.268  But Imerys, the
talc manufacturer, “d[id] not sell talc in Pennsylvania for baby powder or 
ship or distribute talc in Pennsylvania for baby powder,” and the “transactions
between Imerys and Johnson & Johnson did not occur in Pennsylvania.”269 
Similarly, in Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiff resorted to general
jurisdiction based on registration to overcome the limitations of modern
specific jurisdiction doctrine in order to sue in his home state.270  Plaintiff’s
decedent had purchased a used Ford pick-up truck in New Mexico.271  He 
was killed in an accident occurring in New Mexico.272  The truck had
263. See, e.g., Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
264. See, e.g., id. at 651. 
265. Id. at 650–51, 657 (noting that plaintiff alleged that the out-of-state defendant 
“provid[ed] the talc to co-defendant Johnson & Johnson”). 
266. Id. at 651. 
267. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (“[A] defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only
where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not
enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.”). 
268. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. , 480 U.S. 102, 111 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (“[P]lac[ing] . . . a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an
act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.  Additional conduct of 
the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for
example, designing the product for the market in the forum State [or] advertising in the
forum State . . . .”). 
269. Bors, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 651. 








      
 


















originally been sold by Ford to a Ford dealership in Arizona.273  After the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court 
of California,274 some argued that there was no specific jurisdiction in 
such a case because the defendant’s contacts with the forum related to
other instances of this model, not the actual vehicle involved in the crash. 
This extreme reading of Bristol-Myers Squibb was rejected by the Court
in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court.275 But 
jurisdiction under Ford Motor remains unclear for other cases.  What if 
the product is not a car, which is designed for geographically dispersed
use? What if the defendant was smaller and had less of a national presence
than the Ford Motor Company? What if the plaintiff was local to the
forum, but the accident happened out of state?  Or what of the converse 
case, a foreign plaintiff but a local accident?  Or what if the plaintiff was
not local at the time of the accident but moved to the forum afterwards?
Ford Motor leaves jurisdiction unsettled in such cases.  And so, given the 
strictures of stream of commerce theory, general jurisdiction based on
registration offers to rescue the plaintiff. 
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST GENERAL JURISDICTION
BASED ON REGISTRATION
General jurisdiction based on registration raises a variety of concerns. 
The concerns are both theoretical and practical.  General jurisdiction based 
on registration strains at the boundaries of jurisdictional theory.  In at least 
some cases, this warping of the jurisdictional structure is unnecessary to 
achieve what general jurisdiction based on registration offers.  That is, other
less troublesome solutions to the problems of the narrowing of specific
jurisdiction exist. And in many cases, general jurisdiction based on registration 
introduces harms of its own. 
273. Id. at 573. 
274. 
275. 
 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1028 (2021). See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
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A. General Jurisdiction Based on Registration 
Creates Inconvenient Litigation 
Starting with the practical concerns, litigational convenience argues 
against general jurisdiction based on registration.276  In contrast to general
jurisdiction, a state exercising specific jurisdiction is by definition one in 
which at least some of the events underlying the litigation occurred.277 
But the opposite is true in general jurisdiction.  The forum is unconnected
to the facts of the case.  As a result, the litigation has an inherent potential 
for inconvenience. 
Take, for example, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,278 the wellspring of the
forum non conveniens doctrine in the federal courts.  The plaintiff in Gilbert
was a Virginia resident who sued for his losses from a Virginia warehouse 
fire allegedly caused by the defendant’s negligence in Virginia.279 The
defendant was a Pennsylvania corporation, but had registered to do business 
in both Virginia and New York.280  Rather than suing at the location of the
events underlying the claim, plaintiff sued in New York.281  More than a
hint of invidious forum shopping existed: The plaintiff explained his
preference for New York by arguing that the nearly $400,000 amount claimed
was “one which may stagger the imagination of a local jury, which is
surely unaccustomed to dealing with amounts of such a nature.”282  The
district court declined to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, and the Supreme Court affirmed.283 
276. See Twitchell, supra note 15, at 667 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction [carries] the risk
of an inconvenient forum.  If the defendant is forced to defend a claim that is not related
to its forum activities . . . the lack of litigational support and the difficulty in procuring 
witnesses and proof may make it much harder to defend the claim.”); see also Wm. Grayson 
Lambert, The Necessary Narrowing of General Personal Jurisdiction, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 
375, 421 (2016) (“[A]n expansive view of general jurisdiction could result in very 
inconvenient forums.”). 
277. Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 999, 1025 (2012) (“[J]urisdiction over related claims is relatively convenient
[because] the evidence concerning the claim is more likely to be found in the forum 
state.”).
F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1946), rev’d, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
278. 
279. 
 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
Id. at 502–03. 
280. Id. at 503. 
281. Id. at 502–03. 
282. Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F. Supp. 291, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), rev’d, 153
283. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 503, 512. 
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Gilbert was in fact a case based on general jurisdiction by reason of 
registration, as was the Court’s other forum non conveniens decision handed
down the same day, Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty. 
Co.284  That the litigation in Gilbert necessitated the Court’s recognition
of forum non conveniens should give us pause.  If a head of jurisdiction 
leads to the Supreme Court recognizing a power to decline jurisdiction 
upon the grounds of inconvenience, we might be well served to reconsider 
altogether that head of jurisdiction.  Indeed, the Court in Gilbert indicated
that the concerns of an inconvenient forum overrode the consent argument 
of registration. The Court specifically rejected an argument that the issue
of the appropriateness of the forum was put to rest by the defendant’s
consent.285  Earlier cases using registration as a basis for consent to jurisdiction 
only established, the Court explained, that a “defendant may consent to be
sued, and it is proper for the federal court to take jurisdiction, not that the 
plaintiff’s choice cannot be questioned” under forum non conveniens.286 
Nor is Gilbert an outlier. Other Supreme Court forum non conveniens 
cases had their genesis in general jurisdiction, often based on registration.
In Ferens v. John Deere Co., a Pennsylvania plaintiff injured in Pennsylvania 
sued the defendant in Mississippi, which had a uniquely long statute of
limitations.287 The plaintiff thereupon moved to transfer the case back to
Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1404—the statutory treatment of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine for inter-district transfers.288  The Supreme
Court held that even if the plaintiff initiates the transfer, the normal rule 
that after a transfer the law of the transferor court continues to apply still 
obtains.289  But the problem that the Court had to solve would not have
existed were it not for general jurisdiction based on registration: The plaintiff 
sued the defendant, John Deere, in Mississippi, based on John Deere having 
registered to do business there.290  Likewise, in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 
the plaintiff brought suit in California against a Pennsylvania airplane 
manufacturer for a crash in Scotland on behalf of Scottish decedents.291 
Although not stated in the Supreme Court or any lower court’s opinion,
284. 330 U.S. 518, 531 (1947) (noting that jurisdiction in New York over out-of-
state corporate defendants was predicated on service of process in New York). 
285. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506. 
286. Id.
287.  494 U.S. 516, 519–20 (1990). 
288. Id. at 518–20. On the relationship between § 1404 and forum non conveniens, 
see Atl. Mar. Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 60 (2013) (“Section 1404(a) is 
merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens for the subset of cases in 
which the transferee forum is within the federal court system . . . .”).
289. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 519. 
290.  Ferens v. Deere & Co., 819 F.2d 423, 424 (3d Cir. 1987). 
291.  454 U.S. 235, 238–40 (1981). 
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the claim for jurisdiction in California must have been some form of
general jurisdiction, resting on registration or on the pre-Daimler292 broad
conception of general jurisdiction based on “continuous and systematic”
contacts.293  Similarly, jurisdiction was predicated on registration in American 
Dredging Co. v. Miller, a case that considered forum non conveniens
in the context of admiralty jurisdiction.294  In Miller, a Mississippi resident 
moved to Pennsylvania and took work as a seaman.295  After being injured
there, he sued in Louisiana a Pennsylvania corporation that had its principal 
place of business in New Jersey.296  The lower court appeared to base
jurisdiction on the fact the defendant had a registered agent in the state.297 
The particular problems created by general jurisdiction include the 
difficulty of supplying proof from witnesses, documents, and other tangible
evidence that are distant.  General jurisdiction also requires the court to apply
choice of law rules, because the unconnected forum has no legitimate basis 
for applying its own law.298  Additionally, after having identified the properly
governing law, the forum must go to the trouble of ascertaining the law’s 
content and applying it accurately.  All of these factors make for inconvenient 
litigation. Indeed, these are standard factors in applying forum non
conveniens.299  To be sure, many of these factors are lessened, perhaps to 
292. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
293. See Richard D. Freer, Refracting Domestic and Global Choice-of-Forum 
Doctrine Through the Lens of a Single Case, 2007 BYU L. REV. 959, 962 (“Assume that 
Piper is subject to general personal jurisdiction in California, either because it has qualified 
to do business and thus appointed an agent for service there or because it does substantial 
and continuous business there by marketing and selling aircraft in that state.”). 
Attorney, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 799, 818 (1995) (“Many conflicts problems are created by
294. 
295. 
See 510 U.S. 443, 446 (1994). 




 Miller v. Am. Dredging Co., 595 So. 2d 615, 616 (La. 1992). 
See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and the Multistate
the uncoupling of the standards of jurisdictional and legislative competence. In ordinary 
civil cases, the chief villain is the rule of transient jurisdiction . . . [which] allows a forum 
to assert judicial jurisdiction in a case in which, because the facts of the case have no
connection whatsoever to the forum, it clearly lacks legislative jurisdiction.”); see also
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, Part Two: Performance, 59 COLUM.
L. REV. 1171, 1173 (1959) (stating that transient jurisdiction is “primarily responsible for 
our assumed need for imperative conflicts rules”).
299. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) (noting that factors 
include “relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for 
attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility 
of view of premises” and having litigation “in a forum that is at home with the state law
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the point of elimination, if general jurisdiction is based on the defendant’s 
principal place of business. But using corporate registration as a basis for
general jurisdiction does nothing to assure that the ligation is convenient. 
Broad forms of jurisdiction come at the cost of courts having to develop 
and apply doctrines of choice of law and forum non conveniens.300 
Although addressing general jurisdiction based on in-state service, Albert
Ehrenzweig’s half-century old observation rings true today: “American
courts are developing a common law of forum non conveniens as a corrective
of the serious shortcomings in a law of personal jurisdiction . . . .”301 
Choice of law and forum non conveniens, seen in this light, are second-
order problems. The first-order problem is overly broad jurisdiction.  Its 
ill-shaped development has created second-order problems.  Rules for 
choice of law and forum non conveniens, in short, are palliatives designed 
to alleviate symptoms, not to cure the underlying pathology.
Nor can general jurisdiction based on registration be justified by the 
need to give the plaintiff a safe harbor for jurisdiction, free of the uncertainties
and cross seas of minimum contacts specific jurisdiction.302  A safe harbor
—a sure and certain forum303—is a worthwhile objective in the law of 
personal jurisdiction, but plaintiffs do not need fifty such forums as would 
be the case were general jurisdiction based on registration widely accepted. 
Daimler already gives plaintiffs two ready-made forums, the place of
incorporation and the principal place of business.304  Limiting general 
jurisdiction to those two avoids the potential for invidious forum shopping
in which the plaintiff seeks the most advantageous substantive law and
choice of law combination in the nation.  It also assures that there will be 
at least some litigational convenience.305 
that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in
conflict of laws”). 
300. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 
“Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 289–92 (1956). 
301. Id. at 312. 
302. This is one of the traditional justifications for general jurisdiction. See Brilmayer et
al., supra note 11, at 730 (“For the convenience of plaintiffs, general jurisdiction should 
exist somewhere.” (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 16, at 1179)); von Mehren 
& Trautman, supra note 16, at 1179 (“It is . . . appropriate to preserve some place where 
the defendant can be sued on any cause of action.”).
303. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (noting the virtue of state 
of incorporation and principal place of business as be “easily ascertainable”).
304. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
305. See Twitchell, supra note 15, at 667–69. 
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B. General Jurisdiction Based on Registration Is
Unnecessary to Enable Party Joinder 
The current jurisdictional landscape limits plaintiffs’ ability to take
advantage of party joinder rules.  The problem may arise in the context of
either plaintiff joinder or defendant joinder. As to plaintiff joinder, the 
roadblock is Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, in 
which the Court held that the claim of each plaintiff in a multi-plaintiff
case must arise from or relate to the defendant’s in-state contacts as regards 
that plaintiff’s claim;306 it is not enough that some of the other plaintiffs
assert claims arising from the defendant’s identical in-state activities.307 
If many plaintiffs are injured across the nation by a common product of
the defendant, they may naturally want to sue together in one action. And
judicial efficiency would be served by such aggregated litigation.  But
because of Squibb, no one state would have jurisdiction over the defendant 
as to all of the claims except for the defendant’s home state.308  In response
to these dynamics, plaintiffs have begun resorting to claims of general 
jurisdiction based on registration to allow such plaintiff joinder.309 
On the defendant joinder side, the problem is created by Daimler. 
Suppose a plaintiff has claims against several defendants arising from the 
same transaction or occurrence.  The federal rules would allow joinder.310 
But if the defendants acted in different states—suppose a years-long 
exposure to several asbestos products in different states—there may not
be any single state where jurisdiction exists over all defendants.  Before
Daimler, the plaintiff could argue for general jurisdiction based on each 
of the defendants having substantial and continuous activities in the forum. 
But after Daimler, the standard for such jurisdiction is limited to where 
the defendant is “at home,” which is typically limited to the corporation’s
state of incorporation and its principal place of business.311  It is thus
quite possible that there is no one state in which all the defendants are
jurisdictionally “at home.” 
306.  137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–82 (2017). 
307. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
308. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82. 
309. See, e.g., Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., No. 3:17-CV-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL 
1942525 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2018). 
310. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(b). 
311. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (citing Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 924 (2011)). 
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Although general jurisdiction based on registration is helpful to plaintiffs
wishing to join together to sue a single defendant or to a single plaintiff 
wishing to join multiple defendants, other procedural remedies exist and 
general jurisdiction by registration is not necessary to achieve this kind of 
aggregated litigation.  Considering first plaintiff joinder, all plaintiffs could
—although they may not want to—sue where the defendant is subject to
general jurisdiction based on the defendant’s principal place of business 
or state of incorporation.  They could also, as the Court noted in Squibb, 
bring a series of statewide class actions.312  Beyond that, it may be possible
to have a nationwide class action in a state where only some of the
plaintiffs—the named representative plaintiffs—were injured, the rest of
the plaintiffs participating not as parties but as class members.  There are
conflicting views on how Squibb affects personal jurisdiction in class actions. 
Some view it as fatal to a nationwide class, each class member needing
but being unable under Squibb to establish specific jurisdiction over its
claim.313  But other commentators note that some jurisdictional characterizations 
of class actions limit analysis to the named representative plaintiff, not to 
all members of the class, treating the class as an entity for jurisdictional
purposes.314  That is how the federal courts assess diversity jurisdiction; 
only the citizenship of the named representative plaintiff counts.315  Class
members’ citizenships are irrelevant.316  If personal jurisdiction is treated
the same way—consider the jurisdictional question only as to the named 
plaintiff—then Squibb poses no threat to nationwide class actions.  At 
least one lower federal court has so concluded;317 others have found Squibb
to preclude specific jurisdiction in nationwide class actions.318 
312. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1783. 
313. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms:
Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 
1251, 1285 (2018) ( “[U]nder Bristol-Myers[,] . . . it is hard to see how a state court other 
than the defendant’s home state could have specific jurisdiction over most multistate class 
actions.”); see also Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 532–33. 
314. See Dodson, supra note 51, at 31; see also 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:26 (5th ed. 2012) (citing Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory 
Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 614–16 (1987)). 
315. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002).
316. See id.; Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969); 7A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1755 (3d ed. 2005) (“[T]he citizenship of the representative parties continues to be 
determinative.” (citing McLaughlin v. Miss. Power Co., 376 F.3d 344, 354–55 (5th Cir. 
2004))).
317. See Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., No. 17-CV-00564 NC, 2017
WL 4224723, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017). 
318. See, e.g., DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17 C 6125, 2018 WL 461228, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018). 
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Even assuming that Squibb does preclude nationwide class actions, general 
jurisdiction based on registration is not needed to solve the aggregation 
problem. Fact patterns like Squibb, with hundreds of plaintiffs injured
around the country by a defendant’s product, are ripe for Multidistrict 
Litigation (“MDL”) treatment.319  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, “[w]hen civil
actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending
in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”320  Going forward, each
plaintiff in a Squibb fact pattern would file individually in the state where 
he or she interacted with the defendant’s product, i.e., consumed a drug 
or was injured by a consumer product. In most cases, unless the plaintiff 
has roamed, this will be the plaintiff’s home state, but it matters little
because the litigation will not stay there.  Specific jurisdiction is satisfied
by the defendant having marketed the drug or other product in that state. 
Next, one of the plaintiffs in one of the cases will move for a transfer from 
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.  The Panel will designate 
one of the courts in which such a case is filed as the MDL court.321 What
the plaintiffs attempted in Squibb will thus be achieved: consolidated litigation 
in a single court. Of course, the transfer is only for pretrial proceedings,322 
but that is a very large “only.” A mere three to six percent of the cases
transferred to an MDL ever return to the transferring court.323  As a practical 
matter, the resolution of the case, through dispositive pretrial motions or
settlement, occurs in the MDL transferee court.324 And the terms of a global
319. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
320. Id.
 321. See id. § 1407(c)(ii).  MDL transfers can be initiated by a motion made by any
“party in any action in which transfer for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings
under this section may be appropriate.”  Id. 
322. See id.
 323. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 71, 73 (2015); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75
LA. L. REV. 399, 400–01 (2014); Jeffrey L. Rensberger, The Metasplit: The Law Applied
After Transfer in Federal Question Cases, WIS. L. REV. 847, 904 (2018). The widely cited
3% figure comes from Professor Elizabeth Chamblee Burch. See Burch, Judging Multidistrict 
Litigation, supra, at 73; Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, supra, at 400–01.
I calculated a slightly higher number, 6.24%, using more recent data.  See Rensberger, supra, 
at 904. 
324. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).  Professors Bradt and Rave reach the same conclusions
about MDL becoming a substitute for other aggregated litigation such as class actions. See
Bradt & Rave, supra note 313, at 1294 (“If our reading of Bristol-Myers is correct, much
of the mass-tort litigation that has previously been aggregated in state courts is likely to
end up in MDL.  Unless plaintiffs want to litigate alone or on the defendant’s home turf, 
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settlement in an MDL case can be generous to the plaintiffs, the defendant 
being willing to pay a premium on claims in order to achieve a final resolution
of the matter.325  The specter of hundreds or thousands of individual plaintiffs
having to slug it out in different states across the country thus fades. 
The MDL solution is equally availing on the issue of defendant joinder. 
Although many think of an MDL case as involving multiple plaintiffs with
claims against a common defendant, there are many MDL cases in which
a single plaintiff uses the MDL to obtain coordinated treatment of claims
against many defendants.326  In such cases, a plaintiff can achieve its desire
to litigate together against multiple defendants whose activity spanned many
states.
C. General Jurisdiction Based on Registration Violates the
Principle of Proportionality 
One sees a principle of proportionality underlying much of the law of
personal jurisdiction.  A state’s jurisdiction over a defendant is not an
all or nothing proposition.  States have greater or lesser degrees of power over 
a defendant depending on the facts that constitute the relationship between
the defendant and the state.327  Other areas of the law likewise limit the
power of a state to impose a waiver of constitutional rights on or extract a 
consent from a party absent a sufficient and proportionate nexus to a state 
interest. Unlimited general jurisdiction based on registration violates this
proportionality and nexus principle. 
they will file in (or allow their claims to be removed to) federal court in their home states 
or the states where they were injured, and those cases will then be consolidated under
§ 1407 in an MDL.”)
325. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 313, at 1312–13. 
326. See, e.g., In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 26 F. Supp. 3d 1396 (J.P.M.L. 
2014) (consolidation of seventeen actions brought by a single plaintiff in multiple states);
In re Body Sci. LLC Patent Litig., No. 12-10536-FDS,  2012 WL 5449667, at *1 (D. Mass. 
Jan. 11, 2012) (single plaintiff suits against multiple defendants for patent infringement 
consolidated as an MDL); In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., No. 07-ML-
01816-B-RGK (FFMx), 2009 WL 8635984, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009) (“approximately
fifty different lawsuits” brought by a single plaintiff were consolidated); In re Omeprazole
Patent Litig., 490 F. Supp. 2d 381, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (consolidation of patent cases 
brought by single patent holder); In re Triax Co. Patent Litig., 385 F. Supp. 590, 591 
(J.P.M.L. 1974) (transferring three patent infringement actions brought by a single plaintiff 
against three separate defendants).
327. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (describing specific jurisdiction as “a more limited form of submission to a State’s 
authority”); Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State Test for General Personal Jurisdiction, 
66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 81, 85 (2013) (“In contrast to specific jurisdiction, where the 
state has an interest in the conduct at issue in the dispute, general jurisdiction concerns the 
state’s interest in the defendant itself by virtue of the defendant’s relationship with the
forum state.”). 
354
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As to the law of personal jurisdiction, the transactional strand of personal 
jurisdiction noted above328 allows a state to assert jurisdiction in proportion
to the defendant’s connection to the state.  A profound connection to the 
state—domicile, state of incorporation, or principal place of business—
will allow the state the greatest latitude of jurisdiction, general jurisdiction. 
But this follows from the defendant’s profound submission to the state.
In contrast, only a lesser quantum of jurisdiction—specific jurisdiction—
is allowed based on “a more limited form of submission to a State’s
authority for disputes that ‘arise out of or are connected with the activities 
within the state.’”329 
Even if one sets aside Justice Kennedy’s submission theory of jurisdiction, 
the whole scheme of general and specific jurisdiction illustrates the
proportionality principle. A lot of contacts—so many that the defendant 
is metaphorically “at home”—will allow the defendant to be sued on any
claim; a lesser volume of contacts creates jurisdiction only for claims
related to those contacts.330 The extent of jurisdiction is also informed by
the profundity of the defendant’s relationship to the state in addition to its 
enumerative aspects.  That is, in the words of the venerable Shoe, the question 
of contacts is both quantitative and qualitative.331  Some relationships are
so profound that a single instance—one contact if you will—suffices.332 
A corporation can be sued on any claim in the state of its incorporation.333 
328. See supra notes 137–55 and accompanying text. 
329. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
330. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1228
(2007) (“[C]urrent jurisdictional doctrine tends to be grounded in the number of contacts 
a party has with a territorial location.”); see also Brilmayer, supra note 11, at 727 (“[F]ewer 
contacts—perhaps only one—will support specific jurisdiction, [but] general jurisdiction
require[s] a larger number of contacts.”); Stuart M. Riback, Note, The Long Arm and 
Multiple Defendants: The Conspiracy Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 506, 513 (1984) (“Where the suit is not based on the jurisdiction-conferring contact, 
it is necessary to show that the defendant engaged in substantial, ongoing and systematic 
activity within the jurisdiction before the court may properly assert its power over him.
When the suit arises from the contact, however, even a single contact suffices . . . .”).
331. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
332. See Brilmayer, supra note 11, at 727.
 333. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014).  The rationale for such
jurisdiction rests on the quality of the relationship created by incorporation: “[T]he corporation
intentionally chooses to create a relationship with the state of incorporation, presumably 
to obtain the benefits of that state’s substantive and procedural laws.  Such a choice creates
a unique relationship that justifies general jurisdiction over the corporation.” See Brilmayer, 
supra note 11, at 733. 
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A person domiciled in a state can be sued on any claim.334  On the other
hand, a person only temporarily present in a state is not subject to such
broad jurisdiction, unless they have the misfortune of being served with
process while there.335  The latter rule, transient jurisdiction, seems incongruous
with a principle of proportionality.  It is in fact regarded as incongruous
with other modern strands of jurisdiction and has been much criticized on 
that ground.  Shortly before the Supreme Court ratified transient jurisdiction 
in Burnham v. Superior Court, the American Law Institute issued a 
revision to the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws that rejected transient 
presence and service of process as a basis of jurisdiction.336  It noted that
“considerations of reasonableness qualify the power of a State to exercise
personal jurisdiction over an individual on the basis of his physical 
presence” and that jurisdiction is proper only if the defendant had “been 
present . . . for a substantial period of time” or “when there is some connection 
between the State and the particular transaction involved.”337  Jurisdiction 
would be proper, in other words, only if Shoe’s contact principle was
satisfied and the defendant’s presence was proportionate to an assertion 
of jurisdiction.  But a principle of jurisdiction “based upon the unrelated
physical presence of a defendant within the forum state” is inconsistent 
with modern jurisdictional theory.338  Those who argue against transient
jurisdiction thus endorse a proportionality principle.  The problem with
transient jurisdiction is its disproportionality. 
The requirement of proportionality finds expression elsewhere in the 
law. Consent to jurisdiction is a form of waiver.339  Cases addressing general 
jurisdiction by registration often analyze the issue in terms of waiver.340 
334. See supra notes 137–55 and accompanying text. One rationale supporting jurisdiction 
over absent domiciliaries is the reciprocal benefits and burdens of that relationship.
Brilmayer, supra note 11, at 733. In addition, domiciliaries have the right to vote in the state of
their domicile, and subjecting them to jurisdiction in that state does no more than subject 
them to court procedures and substantive law that they “theoretically . . . had a chance to
influence.”  Id.
 335. See Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
336. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28, comment. b (AM. L.
INST. 1971).
337. Id.
 338. Donald J. Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise
of Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565, 589 (1979). 
339. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text; see also Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939) (“Whether such surrender of a personal 
immunity be conceived negatively as a waiver or positively as a consent to be sued, is merely
an expression of literary preference.”).
340. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 384 F. Supp. 3d 532, 538 (E.D. 
Pa. 2019) (“[D]oes a foreign corporation knowingly and voluntarily consent to general 
jurisdiction in a state by registering to do business under a statutory regime that conditions 
the right to do business on the waiver of general jurisdiction?”); see also Acorda Therapeutics,
356
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Given that a corporation may well not in fact have subjectively assented
to jurisdiction when it registered, waiver—a legal consequence attached
to a voluntary act—is perhaps the better way to understand such jurisdiction. 
In general, waivers of constitutional rights must be supported by an
adequate state interest.  A party may lose the right to raise in the Supreme 
Court a constitutional objection to state court proceedings by having failed
to comply with state procedure for raising the objection in state court.341 
But the state law of waiver will be upheld as an adequate independent ground
only to the extent that its application serves a “legitimate state interest.”342 
Thus, an “exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state 
ground inadequate.”343  A state therefore may impose a waiver of a constitutional 
right as a consequence of some action or inaction of a party, but it may do
so only if the waiver is supported by a sufficient state interest. A state 
could not, I presume, have a rule that a defendant waives its objection to
personal jurisdiction if an otherwise properly submitted special appearance 
contains a single spelling error.  The loss of the right must be proportionate 
to the state interest in its procedural rules.
The law of exactions in takings cases provides another example.  Here
the problem is not that the state lacks an interest but instead that the
interest is unconnected to the consequence the state seeks to impose on
the defendant. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has struck down 
state attempts to condition the grant of a land use permit upon a property 
owner’s performing some unrelated service to the state.  For example, in 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, a state regulatory
agency denied the plaintiff a permit to develop his wetlands parcel unless 
he agreed to hire contractors to undertake improvements—replacing culverts
or filling ditches—on agency-owned wetlands several miles distant from 
the plaintiff’s property.344 Similarly, in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, a property owner planned to build a larger residence on his 
beachfront property.345  The state asserted that this would create a visual
barrier obstructing views of the beach.346 The state development agency
Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 590 (D. Del. 2015), aff’d, 817 F.3d 755
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Daimler does not address whether personal jurisdiction is an individual
right, whether it may therefore be waived, whether waiver may occur by consent . . . .”).
341. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446 (1965). 
342. See id. at 448–49. 
343.  Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002). 
344.  570 U.S. 595, 602 (2013). 
345.  483 U.S. 825, 827–28 (1987). 
346. Id. at 835. 
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conditioned granting the permit not upon a condition that enhanced public
views of the beach but instead upon the owner granting a public access
easement along the shoreline between the ocean and their property.347 
And in Dolan v. City of Tigard, a city conditioned a permit to increase the 
paved area of a parcel, which raised a legitimate concern of flooding and 
drainage, on the dedication of certain land to a public access greenway.348 
The problem in each case was that the legitimate state interest implicated
by the permit bore no relationship to the condition imposed.349  Wetland 
conditions on one parcel are not improved by enhancing drainage on
another parcel miles away (Koontz); visual obstruction of a beach from 
the landward side of a structure is not ameliorated by public access along 
the seaward side of the structure (Nollan); and a public access to a greenway 
does not aid in flood control (Dolan). The lesson of these cases is that
while “the government may choose whether and how a permit applicant 
is required to mitigate the impacts of a proposed development . . . it may
not leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental ends 
that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts.”350 
At a broader level, these decisions are applications of the “overarching . . .
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, [which] vindicates the Constitution’s 
enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing people into
giving them up.”351  Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, “the
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right . . . 
in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where
the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the” constitutional right.352 
This doctrine limits a state’s power to coercively extract a consent and
thus impacts the validity of the corporate consent to jurisdiction, a topic 
to which I take up below.353 
General jurisdiction based on registration poses problems similar to the
exaction cases. The state has an interest in regulating the conduct of an 
out-of-state corporation that has a local impact, such as claims arising from 
the conduct of the corporation within the state.  But the state’s ability to
claim jurisdiction in those cases is already allowed by specific jurisdiction.
General jurisdiction allows the state to attach its jurisdiction to disputes
entirely unrelated to the state’s regulatory interest.354  The state is thus attempting 
347. Id. at 829, 836. 
348.  512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8, 392–93 (1994). 
349. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 614; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395. 
350. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added). 
351. Id. at 604. 
352. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
353. See infra notes 373–86 and accompanying text. 
354. Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business 
Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 673 (2012) (“Just as a state cannot regulate or tax a
358
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to “leverage its legitimate interest” in some conduct of the corporation “to 
pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality 
to” the in-state conduct of the corporation.355 Acme Inc. wishes to open an
outlet in Pennsylvania.  Fine, says Pennsylvania, we grant permission on the
condition that you cede to us jurisdiction over your California activities. 
General jurisdiction based on registration is thus untamed and ill-ridden. It
applies to create jurisdiction regardless of the defendant’s connections to 
the state regarding the underlying controversy.  In some cases the state
may have an interest in jurisdiction that is proportionate to the defendant’s 
conduct. But in other cases there is no such state interest.356 This is because
the basis for finding general jurisdiction—registration as a condition of doing 
unrelated business in the state—is unconnected to the underlying controversy. 
A state should not be able to subject an unwilling defendant to jurisdiction
without an interest in doing so that is proportionate to the defendant’s activities 
in the state and a nexus between that activity and the underlying litigation.
The qualification that the defendant is unwilling is important.  True consent
would obviate any jurisdictional objection.  Consent in the context of registration 
has been invoked as a universal solvent that erases any jurisdictional 
objection. But how should consent be understood in the context of general 
jurisdiction based on registration? It is to that topic that we now turn. 
D. General Jurisdiction Based on Registration 
Rests on a Fictive Consent
Commentators357 and cases358 support general jurisdiction by registration
as a straightforward application of the consent basis of jurisdiction. 
Although consent is a valid basis of jurisdiction, its application to general 
jurisdiction is problematic. 
corporation’s out-of-state activities merely because it does business in the state, the state 
has no legitimate interest in asserting judicial authority over such out-of-state activities.”).
355. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 606. 
356. For examples of attempts to use general jurisdiction based on registration to 
forum shop to an entirely unrelated state, see DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., 426 P.3d 1 (Mont. 
2018), and Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 1961, 2018 WL 3025283 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
May 30, 2018).
357. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 70, at 174–79. 
358. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods., No. 5:18-CV-00699, 
2018 WL 3707377, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2018); Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 
1111 (Del. 1988), overruled by Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016). 
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First, the Supreme Court cases that establish general jurisdiction based
on registration predate International Shoe. A precedent’s great age is normally
a reason to respect, not doubt, it.  But when the surrounding law has changed,
one must ask whether the precedent is an artifact of a now obsolete
historical setting.  Indeed, this concern of updating old features of the law 
of jurisdiction to conform to the new law was part of the Court’s reasoning
in casting off the venerable, traditional rule of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
“Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” the Court explained 
in Shaffer v. Heitner, “can be . . . offended by the perpetuation of ancient
forms that are no longer justified.”359 Shoe did more than add another
arrow to the personal jurisdiction quiver, it replaced the quiver with a new
one. The framework of International Shoe “represents a far more sensible 
construct for the exercise of state-court jurisdiction than the patchwork of
legal and factual fictions that has been generated from the decision in
Pennoyer v. Neff.”360  And so pre-Shoe cases must be taken with at least a
grain, and more likely a shaker, of salt.
Much of the jurisdictional reasoning of cases such as Lafayette Insurance
Co. v. French361 and Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v.
Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co.,362 is unavoidably bound up with a now obsolete
jurisdictional apparatus. Under the territorialism that reigned under Pennoyer, 
jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations was difficult to obtain.363 As
French—the earliest case on corporate consent to jurisdiction—understood 
things, a corporation as a creature of the law of its creating state “cannot
be deemed to pass personally beyond the limits of that State.”364  But as a
substitute for actual physical presence, courts developed for corporate
defendants the “doing business” test, under which a corporation that did 
enough in-state business would be deemed “present” in the state.365  Once
present, the defendant would then be subject to jurisdiction for any claim,
359. 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945)).
360. Id. at 219 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also Stanley E. Cox, 
The Missing “Why” of General Jurisdiction, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 153, 186 (2014) (“Shaffer . . .
sweepingly presumed that Shoe’s minimum contacts requirements totally replaced Pennoyer’s
territorial approach.”).
361.  59 U.S. 404 (1855). 
362.  243 U.S. 93 (1917). 
363. See Rhodes, supra note 69, at 393 (“Corporate defendants posed different
conceptual challenges to this power-based jurisdictional regime.  Because a corporation . . .
could not truly be ‘physically present’ within the state’s borders, jurisdiction over a
corporation depended on [a] fiction[] . . . that by designating a corporate agent within the 
state, the corporation consented that in-state service of process on the agent established its
amenability[ to jurisdiction].”).
364. Lafayette Ins. Co., 59 U.S. at 407. 
365. Rhodes, supra note 69, at 395. 
360
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wherever arising, because it would fall within the rule of presence under
transient jurisdiction.366  Cases from this era made distinctions under 
registration statutes between corporations that were in fact doing business, 
and hence present, in the state and those who had registered but had not 
actually done business.367  They declined to interpret state registration 
laws to allow for general jurisdiction when the corporation had registered
but had not actually done any in-state business.368  Thus, cases such as
Pennsylvania Fire, in which the Court extended corporate registration to
general jurisdiction,369 are based not so much on consent as on the fictive
presence that the Court later abandoned in Shoe.370  These cases “adopt[ed] a
presumption that, by serving an in-state registered corporate agent, the 
plaintiff established both that the corporation was doing business in state
(because registration was only required for in-state business) and that the
appropriate service requirements had been met for jurisdiction over unrelated 
causes of action.”371  Several recent cases considering general jurisdiction 
based on registration in today’s jurisdictional world have accordingly
concluded that the older Supreme Court cases in this area are to be regarded 
as relics of their era with no current relevance.372 
Second, there is the question of how to treat consent that is coerced.  A 
corporation’s consent to general jurisdiction “can hardly be characterized
as voluntary,” it has been said, because it is faced with a “Hobson’s choice”
of either declining to do business in the state or submitting to general
jurisdiction.373  Commentators have disagreed on this point.  Professor 
Monestier, for example, argues that the consent in these cases is fictive
366. See id. at 395, 438–39. 
367. See id. at 438–39. 
368. See id. at 439–40 (discussing Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 
405 (1929)).
369. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text.  See generally Pa. Fire Ins. Co.
of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 94–96 (1917). 
370. See Rhodes, supra note 69, at 438–39. 
371. Id. at 439. 
372. See, e.g., DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., 426 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2018) (noting that the 
older U.S. Supreme Court cases “do not hold significant precedential weight in our 
nation’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence”); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 
146 (Del. 2016) (“[T]he older case law was rooted in an era where foreign corporations
could not be sued in other states unless there was some fictional basis to find them
present . . . .”); see also Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 1961, 2018 WL 3025283, at 
*5 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 30, 2018) (explaining that such cases are “relics of the Pennoyer
era”).
373. Mallory, 2018 WL 3025283, at *5. 
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because the corporation lacks a viable choice.374  The “option of refraining
from doing business in the state is not really a viable one for most corporations” 
and the alternative of doing business without registering involves the 
corporation in willful violations of the law.375  As to the latter, federal
corporate reporting requirements such as Sarbanes-Oxley376 may make 
violations of registrations laws a significant concern wholly apart from the 
usually modest377 penalties imposed directly under the registration acts.
Professor Chase, on the other hand, argues that a choice influenced by
incentives is still consensual.378  It “may or may not be difficult for a
corporation—but it is still a choice and the consent, if granted, is not
compelled.”379 Nor are the penalties for nonregistration serious.380  The
most common is merely a temporary closing of the doors of the state’s 
courts until such time as the registration is complied with.381  Which of
these arguments one finds convincing depends upon how one views the 
legitimacy of the demand the state makes upon out-of-state corporations. 
The corporation’s consent seems unobjectionable if the state is making a
reasonable demand for that consent.  But if the state lacks a legitimate basis 
to ask for consent, the request to consent to jurisdiction seems extortionate. 
This in turn leads to the third difficulty of a straightforward view of 
registration as consent.
Discussions on registration as a form of consent tend to overlook the 
distinction between consent and waiver.382  Consent is better understood 
as being limited to cases of a true, subjective agreement to jurisdiction.
Defendants may have such a subjective desire to submit to the court’s 
jurisdiction when they prefer the forum chosen by the plaintiff for tactical
reasons or they wish to have the litigation resolved sooner rather than 
later. Waiver, on the other hand, is a consequence of some other voluntary
action. “The court,” Learned Hand explained in addressing jurisdiction based
on registration, “in the interests of justice, imputes results to the voluntary 
act of doing business within the foreign state, quite independently of any 
intent.”383  But imputing a waiver as a result of some other action presumes 
374. Monestier, supra note 7, at 1390. 
375. Id.
376. 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b) (2020) (requiring a code of ethics for corporations that 
are “designed to deter wrongdoing and to promote . . . [c]ompliance with applicable
governmental laws, rules and regulations”). 
377. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
378. See Chase, supra note 70, at 180. 
379. Id.
 380. Id. 
381. See id.
 382. See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text. 
383. Smolik v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). 
362
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that the law may fairly impose such a consequence.  A waiver can only be 
imputed if it is required by the “purposes of justice.”384 Whether justice
requires courts to treat a defendant as if it consented to jurisdiction when 
it in fact did not remains the irreducible question.  Moreover, it is a question 
that must be answered by some principle exterior to a theory of consent. 
There must be some legitimate reason for treating a defendant as if it
consented. Arguments for jurisdiction based on a fictional consent thus 
“assume almost exactly what they set out to prove.”385  Instead of such 
circularity, “rules must be developed that delineate what voluntary actions 
are ‘sufficiently affiliating’ to legitimate the exercise of power,” rules that
are based on a “meta theory of legitimacy, independent of consent.”386 
One place to look for answers to such questions is the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.  In general, this doctrine holds that a state may
not grant a benefit only upon the condition that a person forego a constitutional
right.387  Admittedly, this doctrine is often regarded as a muddle.388  But
it has been applied—albeit, in older cases—to the very context at issue
here: permission to do business within a state.  In Frost & Frost Trucking
Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, the Supreme Court invoked the
doctrine to hold unconstitutional a state regulatory scheme that characterized 
“using the public highways [by a] private carrier” as a “special privilege”
that was granted “upon condition that he shall dedicate his property to the 
quasi-public use of public transportation,” becoming a public carrier.389 
The Court rejected this appropriation.390 In doing so, the court quoted with
approval a dissent by Justice Day in the earlier case of Security Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Prewitt: 
384. Id.
385.  Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L. J. 1277, 1304 
(1989).
386. Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C.
L. REV. 529, 542 (1991). 
387. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits
of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 (1988) (“[E]ven if a state has absolute discretion to
grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that 
improperly ‘coerce,’ ‘pressure,’ or ‘induce’ the waiver of constitutional rights.”). 
388. See Alexander Volokh, The Constitutional Possibilities of Prison Vouchers, 72 
OHIO ST. L.J. 983, 1030 (2011) (“[C]alling it a ‘doctrine’ may be somewhat charitable, 
since it’s more like a number of apparently unrelated (and perhaps incoherent) subdoctrines in
different constitutional fields.”). 
389.  271 U.S. 583, 591 (1926). 
390. Id. at 599. 
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[T]he right to do business cannot be made to depend upon the surrender of a right 
created and guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.  If this were otherwise, the
state would be permitted to destroy a right created and protected by the Federal 
Constitution under the guise of exercising a privilege belonging to the state . . . .391 
Similarly in Terral v. Burke Construction Co., the Court struck down an
Arkansas statute that revoked a foreign corporation’s license to do business
if it removed a case from an Arkansas state court to federal court.392  “[A]
state may not, in imposing conditions upon the privilege of a foreign
corporation’s doing business in the state, exact from it a waiver of the
exercise of its constitutional right to resort to the federal courts . . . .”393 
These cases come rather close to the matter at hand. They involve the
state conditioning a corporation’s doing business upon submission to an 
unrelated burden.  And Burke was an effort by a state to aggrandize its courts’ 
power through the leverage of registration to do business.  In Burke, the 
defendant was coerced to forgo a right it otherwise had to a federal forum.394 
And the federal judiciary was deprived of its ability to hear cases that
otherwise would have come to it.  There was thus a shift in the distribution 
of jurisdiction toward the state and away from the federal courts at the 
expense of both individual defendants and the federal courts.  The attempt 
to acquire power in the present context differs only in detail.  Were it not 
for mandated consent395 via registration, cases falling within general
jurisdiction in the registration state would have been heard only in other
states or in federal courts.  Absent the general jurisdiction purportedly 
created by registration, the defendant could only have been sued in other 
courts.  Thus, the situation is almost exactly parallel to Burke. The state
is attempting to arrogate to itself a unit of litigation that by the otherwise 
applicable rules of jurisdiction would be in another court.  This is an





 202 U.S. 246, 268 (1906) (Day, J., dissenting). 
 257 U.S. 529, 530 (1922). 




 A purposefully crafted oxymoron. 
That personal jurisdiction limitations are based at least in part on notions of
horizontal federalism—restricting states from overreaching as against sister states—has a 
long pedigree and despite scholarly criticism a current vitality in recent cases.  See Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (“The sovereignty of each 
State implies a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States.” (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980))); see also J. McIntyre Mach.,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (“[I]f another State were to assert jurisdiction 
in an inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits that each State
has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States.”).
364
58-2_POST_RENSBERGER_PAGES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2021 2:33 PM    









    
   
 








    
 












[VOL. 58:  309, 2021] A Limited Role for General Jurisdiction 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Professor Sullivan’s influential article on the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is one of the more successful attempts to make sense of it.397  Her
work identifies the problem areas as those in which the state in extracting
a waiver attempts either to redistribute power and rights between states
and rightsholders or among rightsholders.398  In the context of general 
jurisdiction based on registration, the relevant problem is a state’s attempt
to leverage power against a person—the corporation—holding rights against
the state. A state may
tend to use the strategic manipulation of gratuitous benefits to aggrandize public 
power . . . [and it] overreaches when it offers benefits in order to gain leverage over
constitutional rights.  The state may have many good reasons to deal out regulatory 
exemptions and subsidies, but gaining strategic power over constitutional rights
is not one of them.399 
To the extent that the state is attempting to use general jurisdiction in a
case of invidious forum shopping,400 it violates this principle.  There is no 
legitimate reason to require submission to jurisdiction other than simply
to acquire power. The matter might be different if there is some legitimate 
reason for the state to assert jurisdiction, such as a local plaintiff it seeks
to protect. But in cases of “pure” forum shopping, the state would appear
to be attempting to extract a concession when it has no legitimate reason
to seek one.401 
Finally, the reality of consent is particularly problematic for corporations
whose business is based on an interstate network. Some argue that a
defendant can choose to either do business and register in a state or choose 
to avoid that state and not do business there.402  But the business model of 
some defendants does not allow for a checkerboard of business operations. 
397. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 
(1989). 
398. See id. at 1491 (“A systemic approach to unconstitutional conditions problems 
recognizes that constitutional liberties regulate three relationships: the relationship between
government and rightholders, horizontal relationships among classes of rightholders, and
vertical relationships among rightholders.”).
399. Id. at 1493. 
400. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
401. For a case applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the issue of 
general jurisdiction based on registration, see In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI),
384 F. Supp. 3d 532, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (holding that such jurisdiction “violates the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine because it conditions the benefit of doing business in
the state with the surrender of constitutional due process protections”).
402. See Chase, supra note 70, at 173. 
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Network industries need to have operations in as many states as possible. 
The paradigm case is a railroad, such as the defendant in DeLeon v. BNSF 
Railway Co.403  The railroad could not easily elect to forgo doing business 
in Montana.  Its entire business model, its rationale for existing, is its ability 
to move things physically from one state to another.  It could theoretically 
decline to have railroad tracks in Montana, but that would significantly
undermine its operations in other states.  Not only could it not ship to Montana, 
it could not ship from North Dakota—or from the further eastern ports on
the Great Lakes in Wisconsin and Minnesota—to Idaho or Washington in
the west without detouring south.  A state that seeks to assert general jurisdiction
based on corporate registration thus imposes costs on neighboring states.
For this reason, general jurisdiction based on registration raises concerns
of imposing unduly on interstate commerce.  The Supreme Court in Bendix 
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., held that a state statute that 
tolled the statute of limitations so long as an out-of-state corporation did 
not maintain a registered agent for service of process violated the dormant
commerce clause.404  The Court was concerned that the cost of securing the 
protection of a statute of limitations was a submission to the “significant 
burden” of unlimited jurisdiction: a corporation must “choose between
exposure to the general jurisdiction of Ohio courts or forfeiture of the 
limitations defense.”405  Indeed, networked industries receive special
solicitude under the dormant commerce clause.406  Whether or not general 
jurisdiction based on registration rises to the level of a commerce clause
violation, it certainly creates bad jurisdictional policy.  The old learning
in the personal jurisdiction case law about horizontal federalism407 and the
403. 426 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2018).  This case is discussed supra notes 171–82 and accompanying 
text.
404. 486 U.S. 888, 891–93 (1988); see also John F. Preis, The Dormant Commerce 
Clause As a Limit on Personal Jurisdiction, 102 IOWA L. REV. 121, 146 (2016).  Professor
Preis concludes that general jurisdiction by way of registration violates the dormant commerce
clause as being both discriminatory, see Preis, supra, at 138, and unduly burdensome, see
id. at 154. 
405. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 893. 
406. See, e.g., New York v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 31–32 (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[E]lectricity . . . transmission is inherently interstate. It takes 
place over a network or grid, which consists of a configuration of interconnected transmission
lines that cross state lines.”); see also Charles J. Cooper & Brian Stuart Koukoutchos,
Federalism and the Telephone: The Case for Preemptive Federal Deregulation in the New
World of Intermodal Competition, 6 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 293, 304 (2008) 
(arguing that “industries whose interconnected networks cut across state boundaries, such 
as the electric power, railroad, trucking, airline, and gas pipeline industries” need to be
free of inconsistent state regulation). 
407. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
(noting that jurisdictional limits “act[] to ensure that the States through their courts, do not 
366
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need to consider the “shared interest of the several States”408 has new
salience in this context. 
If one accepts this argument as to networked defendants, the obvious 
next question is what other types of businesses have network structures
that also raise this concern.  Shipping companies, such as FedEx, have
increased value in every state by virtue of their ability to ship to every other 
state.  Imagine the decrease in utility of a, say, thirty-eight state FedEx. 
Interstate franchises also have network effects.  A consumer driving through
Ohio has a good sense of what he can expect if he chooses to spend the
night at a Red Roof Inn or a Motel 6. But he knows that not from his own 
prior experience in Ohio.  He would know it from experience at other 
iterations of the franchise he has encountered in other states.  The broader 
a franchise spreads nationally, the greater the national name recognition, 
the greater the value to the consumer in having a stock of knowledge against
which to gauge a market transaction. If a given state were to assert general
jurisdiction by registration and as a result Motel 6 chose not to operate 
there, the utility of the Motel 6 brand is diminished.  And, importantly, it
is diminished not only in the state from which it has withdrawn, it is 
diminished in every state.
VI. RESOLUTION: A LIMITED USE FOR GENERAL JURISDICTION
The foregoing identifies the utility of and drawbacks to general jurisdiction 
based on registration. From this discussion, one can now sketch out some
solutions.  What I propose below is to allow general jurisdiction based on 
registration if there is also a sufficient interest of the state in asserting
jurisdiction, some “plus” factor.  Under this analysis, some assertions of
general jurisdiction based on registration are proper and others are not. 
I previously identified409 six types of cases in which a plaintiff may seek 
to use general jurisdiction based on registration: 
1. to provide for jurisdiction for a local plaintiff who has moved 
away from the state where the defendant was subject to jurisdiction
or who temporarily traveled to another state and was injured 
there; 
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a 
federal system”). 
408. Id.
 409. See supra notes 171–277 and accompanying text. 
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2. to provide jurisdiction when the injury-causing product was 
taken by a third party to a state where the defendant lacks 
minimum contacts;
3. to facilitate joinder on the plaintiff side of multiple plaintiffs 
or of multiple claims by one plaintiff; 
4. to facilitate joinder of defendants that are not otherwise subject 
to jurisdiction in a single state;  
5. in order to take advantage of a longer statute of limitations; 
and 
6. simple invidious forum shopping.
Looking at general jurisdiction based on registration in this way allows 
us to categorize assertions of such jurisdiction in relation to the reasons a 
state may have for asserting it.  In a given category, a state may have an
interest in asserting jurisdiction but because of doctrinal limitations,
specific jurisdiction fails. General jurisdiction based on registration in 
such cases would appear appropriate.  The state interest in other categories 
is more difficult to discern and the assertion of general jurisdiction based
on registration therefore more suspect. The question in general is whether 
the reason for invoking the jurisdiction of the forum state is of sufficient 
weight to satisfy the concerns, discussed above, of proportionality, of 
unconstitutional conditions, and of litigational convenience. 
Finally, it should be remembered that in these cases the defendant has
no forum activities that would justify an assertion of jurisdiction on some
other basis. The defendant is not a complete stranger to the forum because 
it has registered to do business.  But the particular claim in question does
not arise from or relate to the defendant’s activities in the forum.  If it did, 
specific jurisdiction would exist and general jurisdiction based on registration 
would be unnecessary.  For this reason, in assessing the nature of the forum’s 
interest, if any, in the case, it is a given that the forum has no jurisdictionally 
sufficient basis for regulating the particular conduct of the defendant at
issue. 
A. General Jurisdiction in Order to Accommodate a Local Plaintiff 
If the plaintiff is local to the forum, the state will have an interest in
providing a forum for him to receive redress.410  In many cases, a local 
plaintiff will be able to assert specific jurisdiction. He may do so if the
defendant acted in the plaintiff’s state, such as by committing a tort there 
410. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (explaining why the 
forum “ha[d] a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents 
when their insurers refuse to pay claims”). 
368
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or selling a defective product there, or if the defendant acted only in another 
state but its actions had consequences in the plaintiff’s state for which the 
defendant is jurisdictionally responsible—i.e., the defendant satisfies 
whichever stream of commerce test the Court settles on.  But specific
jurisdiction will fail for a local plaintiff in the following situations:
 The plaintiff was injured by the defendant in another state 
and the plaintiff later moved to the forum; 
 The plaintiff lived in the forum state the entire time but 
temporarily left, went to another a state, and was injured
there; 
 The plaintiff never left his or her home state, but the product 
injuring the plaintiff found its way there in a way for which
the defendant is not jurisdictionally responsible.
Regardless of how the plaintiff came to interact with the defendant, the fact 
remains that the plaintiff is a state citizen, a person the state has an interest
in protecting.  Some of the cases in this category present more sympathetic
cases for jurisdiction than others.  Perhaps ironically, the case of after-
acquired domicile, those in which the plaintiff permanently relocates to 
the forum after having been injured while living elsewhere, is more appealing 
than those in which the plaintiff never moved his or her domicile but was 
injured while temporarily out of state.  This result is perhaps surprising
because in the case of a plaintiff injured while temporarily out of state, the
forum had an interest in the plaintiff’s wellbeing before, at the time of,
and after the plaintiff’s injury elsewhere.  In the case of a post-injury 
relocation, on the other hand, the forum had no interest in the plaintiff at 
the time of the injury or other wrong.  But a state asserting jurisdiction for 
a plaintiff injured by the defendant while sojourning elsewhere imposes
jurisdiction on a stay-at-home defendant for the benefit of a plaintiff who 
chose to go the defendant’s state. In contrast, a state asserting jurisdiction
for the benefit of a local plaintiff who was injured in the state of his former
home benefits a plaintiff who was always acting in his home state, albeit
he changed his identification of home.411  But these are exceedingly fine
gradations upon which to base a distinction of constitutional magnitude, 
411. I am assuming here that the plaintiff’s relocation was bona fide and not a strategic
effort to create jurisdiction.  A court should discount after-acquired domicile if the plaintiff
was in that sense forum shopping. 
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and it is preferable to attempt no such distinction.  In either case, the state
has an interest in protecting the plaintiff.
Litigational convenience is satisfied by the presence of a local plaintiff. 
The litigation will at the least be convenient for one party.  And in a personal 
injury case, the plaintiff is him or herself an item of real evidence; evidence
of the present physical condition of the plaintiff will necessarily be available
in the forum.  As to the concern of the state imposing an unconstitutional 
condition, the state in effect is conditioning entry into its market upon a
consent to jurisdiction but only if the injured party is local.  This seems much
less of a disproportionate exchange than if the plaintiff has no connection
to the forum.  A nexus exists between the state’s imposition of the burden 
and its interests. 
This leaves the case of an always-at-home plaintiff injured by a defendant’s
product that found its way to the plaintiff outside of accepted jurisdictional
channels. The state interest here is as strong as in the foregoing cases, and 
the plaintiff has not ventured out of state to voluntarily put him or herself 
within the defendant’s ambit.  The argument for jurisdiction based on
litigational convenience may be even stronger than in the cases of roaming 
plaintiffs because in these cases the event of the injury may itself have
happened in the forum state.  For example, the plaintiff may have been
injured in his home state by a product that came to him there outside the 
stream of commerce.  And, again, the state is not improperly leveraging its 
jurisdictional power. It has an interest in imposing a jurisdictional consequence
upon the defendant’s doing business in the state when it seeks to protect
a local plaintiff.412 
B. General Jurisdiction in Order to Facilitate Joinder 
Some plaintiffs assert general jurisdiction based on registration in order 
to facilitate joinder of one kind or another.  It may be party joinder of
plaintiffs, or joinder of multiple claims by a single plaintiff, or joinder of 
multiple defendants that are not otherwise subject to jurisdiction in a 
single state.  Joinder of plaintiffs is limited by the strictures of Bristol-Myers
Squibb, which requires that each plaintiff’s claim be related to the defendant’s
in-state contacts.413  General jurisdiction based on registration would allow 
412. The result suggested by this paragraph is supported by Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 
Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021), which upheld specific jurisdiction 
over a car manufacturer even though the defendant designed, manufactured, and sold the 
car outside the forum because the forum was the home of the plaintiff and the site of the 
injury. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. While general jurisdiction is no
longer needed in such a case, it is still useful if some of the elements that made for jurisdiction 
in Ford Motor are lacking. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
413. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). 
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plaintiffs with related claims to sue a common defendant together or a 
single plaintiff to assert multiple claims against one defendant that arose 
in different states.  Or general jurisdiction based on registration may be
used in connection with defendant joinder to sue, in a single suit, a group 
of defendants who are not otherwise subject to suit in a single state.  In an 
asbestos case, for example, the exposure may have occurred in different 
states at different times. One defendant’s product injured the plaintiff in
state A. Another defendant’s product injured the plaintiff in state B.  And 
so on. Before Daimler restricted the use of general jurisdiction based on 
a high number of unrelated contacts, the plaintiff might easily find a single 
state where each of the defendants had, under the former standard, “substantial
and continuous” contacts.414 But jurisdiction in such cases is now limited 
to usually no more than two states where the defendant is “at home,” its
state of incorporation and the state of its principal place of business.415  To 
overcome this problem, the plaintiff sues some defendants in a state where
they are otherwise subject to jurisdiction—e.g., a state where a number of 
the defendants are incorporated or have their principal place of business—
and joins the others in reliance on registration to do business.
In such cases, the plaintiff is either local to the forum state or is not.  If
the plaintiff is local, then general jurisdiction based on registration should
be upheld for the reasons stated in the preceding section.  In the event that
a court disagrees with that analysis and determines that the interest of a 
state in providing a forum for a local plaintiff is by itself insufficient to
support jurisdiction, the enhanced judicial efficiency created by joinder
should be an additional factor that would, in combination with a local plaintiff, 
give the state a sufficient interest.
The joinder-based argument for general jurisdiction based on registration 
is as follows. First, the concern that general jurisdiction based on registration
creates litigational inconvenience by placing the adjudication in an unconnected
forum is undercut by the litigational inconvenience that would arise were 
general jurisdiction based on registration not available.  The alternative to 
using general jurisdiction in a forum unrelated to some of the claims is multiple 
duplicative litigation in connected forums.  There is no gain in judicial 
414. See Robertson & Rhodes, supra note 50, at 779 (noting that, before Daimler, 
lower courts upheld general jurisdiction “when a defendant’s in-state contacts were continuous, 
systematic, and substantial” (citing Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye
Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction after Dailer AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 101, 110 (2015)). 
415. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
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efficiency when the law atomizes the litigation into multiple lawsuits in
multiple forums. Second, a state investing judicial resources in hosting a 
significant part of the litigation has an interest in its resources being used
efficiently.416  A state’s “efforts and expense on a plaintiff’s behalf are wasted
when that applicant obtains a duplicative remedy in another State.”417 
But what if the plaintiff is not local? Is a naked interest in efficient
litigation sufficient to create a state interest when the state has no interest
in the plaintiff or in the defendant’s activity that creates liability to the 
plaintiff? General jurisdiction is much harder to justify here.  To make
the discussion more concrete, suppose a plaintiff wished to sue multiple 
defendants for asbestos exposure that occurred over many years and in
multiple states.  If the plaintiff is domiciled in the forum state, one can
easily discern a state interest in facilitating his or her recovery against all 
defendants in a single proceeding. But that interest is far less apparent
when the plaintiff is not domiciled in the forum.  The plaintiff may have 
a jurisdictionally viable claim against one or more defendants.  As to that
litigation properly before the courts of the forum, the state would have an 
interest in fair and efficient procedures.  But it stretches too far to allow 
the state to bootstrap this interest into an interest in also adjudicating claims 
against other defendants who are not otherwise subject to jurisdiction simply
to promote efficiency.
In the first place, the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that
personal jurisdiction is not simply about efficiency.418  Due process limitations
on jurisdiction are “more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient 
or distant litigation.”419  And “even if the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of 
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power 
to render a valid judgment.”420 
Second, state interests must be assessed on a claim-by-claim basis if 
specific jurisdiction is to make any sense.  If a state had an interest in 
“litigation” considered as an amalgam of all claims a plaintiff or group of 
416. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968) 
(“[T]here [is an] interest of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient 
settlement of controversies . . . [and a] public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever 
possible . . . .”). 
417. Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 293 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
418. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) 
(listing efficiency as just one of several factors that courts consider in determining personal 
jurisdiction, with other factors including: the burden on the defendant, the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining relief, and the shared interest of several states in furthering social policies). 
419. Id. at 294 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
420. Id. (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254). 
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plaintiffs against a defendant or group of defendants then it would be
unnecessary to inquire into whether any one of the defendants in particular
had contacts related to the litigation so long as there was jurisdiction over 
one. A state does not have jurisdiction over defendant X because it has
jurisdiction over defendant Y.  Nor, as Bristol-Myers Squibb teaches,421 
does it have jurisdiction over claim X merely because it has jurisdiction 
over a factually related claim Y. Several other Supreme Court cases bear
this out. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the Court found
that two defendants of four lacked contacts with the forum and were not 
subject to jurisdiction even though the case proceeded as to the other
defendants.422  Likewise in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,
the Court doubted the interest of the forum to hear a claim for contribution
against an impleaded defendant even though the forum clearly had jurisdiction 
over the initial defendant and had invested judicial resources into the resolution 
of the main claim.423  If an interest in efficiency that sprang from adjudication 
of another claim against another defendant was sufficient for jurisdiction, 
these cases would have come out the other way.  The Supreme Court specifically
addressed jurisdiction in the multiparty context in Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Shutts.424  In Shutts, a Kansas court adjudicated a nationwide class action
claiming mineral interest royalty underpayments against a Delaware corporation
with its headquarters in Oklahoma.425  A small number of the royalty
owners and mineral leases were in Kansas.426  The Court upheld personal
jurisdiction over the absent class members because they had a right to opt 
out and the burdens on class members were low.427 Notably, the Court
did not rely on a procedural interest in efficiency to allow jurisdiction.  If 
a state could assert jurisdiction over a claim simply because it had jurisdiction
over related claims, the Court would not have needed to rely on the class
action opt out procedure to justify its conclusion in favor of jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the other question in Shutts was choice of law: May Kansas
constitutionally apply Kansas law to all claims, even those involving non-






See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–84 (2017). 
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288 & n.3. 
 480 U.S. 102, 114–15 (1987). 
 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985). 
Id. at 799. 
426. Id. at 801. 
427. Id. at 811–12. 
428. See id. at 816. 
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rejected in the context of choice of law a state interest in efficiency that 
overcomes the normal requirement that a state have some connection to a
dispute in order to apply its own law: Constitutional limits on choice of 
law are “not altered by the fact that it may be more difficult or more 
burdensome to comply with the constitutional limitations because of the 
large number of transactions which the State proposes to adjudicate and
which have little connection with the forum.”429 
General jurisdiction, in this context, asserts power over a defendant not 
otherwise subject to jurisdiction over a claim that is unrelated to anything 
the defendant did in the forum.  This is done in favor of a plaintiff—who
is likewise unconnected to the forum—simply because the plaintiff has
claims against other defendants who are connected to the forum or because 
the plaintiff has claims similar to those of other plaintiffs who do have 
forum-related claims.  Such an assertion of jurisdiction violates the
proportionality principle because the assertion of power is unconnected
to a corresponding state interest. For the same reason, extracting consent
to general jurisdiction in such a case improperly conditions entry into the 
state on matters as to which the state has no interest.  The state is saying,
in effect, you may come into our state and transact business, but only if you 
consent to be sued here by plaintiffs who are not our citizens on claims 
arising elsewhere, so long as claims against another defendant or by another 
plaintiff are similar to those against you.430 
Finally, as noted above, even assuming that a state may properly be so
solicitous toward the efficiency interests of out-of-state plaintiffs, there 
are other ways for efficiency to be served.  MDL can be used as a substitute 
for joinder and gain much of its efficiency when either plaintiff or defendant
joinder is the problem.431  And class actions may be a substitute on the
plaintiff joinder side. 
429. Id. at 821. 
430. Rocky Rhodes and Cassandra Burke Robertson have recently proposed a Model 
Act to clarify and constrain general jurisdiction based on registration. See Charles W. 
“Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, A New State Registration Act: Legislating
a Longer Arm for Personal Jurisdiction, 57 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 377, 381 (2020).  Many of
their conclusions align with mine, especially the need for the forum to have an interest in 
asserting jurisdiction.  One of our chief differences, however, is the validity of a state interest
in efficiency.  Their Model Act would allow general jurisdiction based on registration over 
a corporation when another defendant “is subject to general jurisdiction in this state;
and . . . the claims against the defendants are so closely connected that it is expedient to 
hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of conflicting judgments resulting from 
separate proceedings.” Id. at 413. 
431. See supra notes 319–21 and accompanying text. 
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C. General Jurisdiction in Order to Take Advantage of a 
Longer Statute of Limitations 
Some plaintiffs attempt to use general jurisdiction based on registration 
to take advantage of a longer statute of limitations in the forum.  General 
jurisdiction based on registration should not be available solely to accommodate 
a plaintiff seeking to take advantage of a long statute of limitations.  This
is a separate question from whether a state may choose to apply its own
longer statute of limitations as a matter of choice of law if the state has 
jurisdiction.  As to the latter question, the Supreme Court has approved the 
traditional and still frequently used choice of law rule that a forum may
always apply its own longer statute of limitations.432 
Once again, if the forum is also the plaintiff’s home state, then the
plaintiff should be allowed to use general jurisdiction based on registration 
for that reason alone.  But what of a plaintiff who is a stranger to the forum? 
Suppose a case in which the plaintiff, the defendant, and the underlying
liability producing event are all foreign to the forum.  The plaintiff seeks 
to use the forum solely because it has a long, perhaps uniquely long, statute
of limitations and the defendant has registered to do business. 
The interest of a forum state in providing jurisdiction to enable recovery 
to a foreign plaintiff on a foreign claim is not apparent.433  As noted above,
the traditional characterization of statutes of limitation is that they are 
procedural, meaning that—as to choice of law—the forum applies its own
longer or shorter statute of limitations.  But this assumes that the state has 
jurisdiction. No one has ever argued that a state acquires jurisdiction
by virtue of a longer statute of limitations.  It is one thing for a state to act
altruistically to aid a foreign plaintiff by applying its own law to a case in 
which the defendant is otherwise subject to jurisdiction.  It is quite another
to say that a state acquires coercive power over a defendant in order to
give advantage to a plaintiff in whom the state is uninterested.
The Supreme Court has considered jurisdiction in cases where the
plaintiff was forum shopping for a longer statute of limitations, but it did 
not rely on the longer period of limitations as a reason for asserting 
432. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988). 
433. As to choice of law, “when the forum has the longer statute of limitations . . . 
and when neither the plaintiff nor the claim is significantly affiliated with the forum, it is
hard to imagine that any policy behind the forum’s statute of limitations would be furthered by
its application.”  Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law—Interest Analysis: They Still Don’t Get It, 
40 WAYNE L. REV. 1121, 1181 (1994). 
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jurisdiction.434  Instead, jurisdiction rested on other grounds.  In Keeton 
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was local
to the New Hampshire forum.435  New Hampshire was the only state where
the claim for libel was not time-barred.436 The Court upheld jurisdiction 
on the basis of minimum contacts because the defendant’s magazine had 
a circulation in the forum of between 10,000 and 15,000 copies.437  It did 
not hold that a state has jurisdiction simply to provide altruistically a 
forum for a claim time-barred elsewhere. Instead, the Court relied upon
the contacts of the defendant and explained at some length that the fact of 
local publication created a state interest: “False statements of fact harm 
both the subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement [and]
New Hampshire may rightly employ its libel laws to discourage the deception
of its citizens.”438  Moreover, because of the publication within the forum,
the plaintiff suffered a reputational injury there giving the state an additional
interest.439 
Allowing a state to assert jurisdiction simply because it desires to aid a 
plaintiff with whom it has no connection conflicts with the requirement
that a court assess the interest of the forum state in evaluating minimum 
contacts jurisdiction.  Even if a defendant has minimum contacts with the
state, the court must still assess fairness,440 and one of the factors is “the 
forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute.”441  In  Asahi, Justice
O’Conner’s plurality opinion denied that the forum had an interest in
adjudicating an indemnification dispute because the litigants were two 
foreign parties.442  Lower courts likewise find no state interest when the
plaintiff, the defendant, and the underlying transaction are all out of state.443 
434. 
435. 
See Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984). 
Id. at 772. 
436. Id. at 773. 
437. Id. at 772, 773–74 (“Respondent’s regular circulation of magazines in the forum
State is sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the
contents of the magazine.”).
438. Id. at 776. 
439. Id.
 440. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“Once it has 
been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum 
State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’”
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945))). 
441. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
292 (1980)).
442.  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. , 480 U.S. 102, 114–15 (1987). 
443. See, e.g., OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1096 
(10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that, although “a state may . . . have an interest in adjudicating a
dispute between two non-residents where the defendant’s conduct affects forum residents,” the
Kansas forum lacked an interest when neither Plaintiff nor Defendants were Kansans and
376
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A state may have an interest or a state may wish to be altruistic, but a
desire to pursue altruism is not an interest.444  Indeed, altruism is the
opposite of pursuing self-interest.  If the state had an interest, it would be 
acting out of self-interest, not altruism.  Thus, one cannot construct the
necessary interest from the mists of altruism.
D. Simple Invidious Forum Shopping
The remaining category is unadorned forum shopping, cases in which
there is no discernable convenience reason for the plaintiff to choose the 
forum. This is obviously the least attractive case for allowing general
jurisdiction based on registration. Even if a court would, contrary to the
analysis above, find registration a proper basis for jurisdiction to promote 
joinder efficiency or to aid a plaintiff in overcoming a statute of limitations
problem, at a minimum courts should not recognize general jurisdiction 
based on registration when there is no discernible reason for it.  Such 
jurisdiction is disproportionate to the state’s interest, it is the imposition 
of a condition upon the defendant that has no nexus to any legitimate state 
interest, and it creates inconvenient litigation.
no tort or breach of contract was alleged as to any Kansas resident); Leney v. Plum Grove 
Bank, 670 F.2d 878, 880 (10th Cir. 1982) (“Colorado [as the forum] probably has little 
interest in adjudicating this dispute or helping this plaintiff obtain relief: Plaintiff is a 
California resident who sought payment on the letter of credit through his California bank, 
and the Illinois bank’s refusal to honor it took place in Illinois.”); SeaHAVN, Ltd. v.
Glitnir Bank, 226 P.3d 141, 153 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (“Washington has no particular
interest in resolving the dispute between these two foreign corporations.”); Disney Enters., 
Inc. v. Esprit Fin., Inc., 981 S.W.2d 25, 32 (Tex. App. 1998) (“Texas ha[d] . . . no interest . . . 
[when] [n]o Texas residents are directly or indirectly involved in the suit; no Texas residents 
have been harmed by the alleged transactions; there are no witnesses residing in Texas; 
and there is no evidence to be gathered in Texas.”). 
In general, states find that they have an interest in hosting the litigation when the plaintiff 
is local, when the plaintiff resides elsewhere but has local business, when the economic 
impact of an injury is being felt locally, when there is injury to land within the forum, and
when forum law is to be applied.  See Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying “Fair Play and
Substantial Justice”: How the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal 
Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 451–55 (1991). 
444. See Preis, supra note 404, at 141 (“[A] state has no legitimate interest in protecting
non-residents injured out of state.” (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982))). 
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General jurisdiction based on registration leads to a state overreaching 
if not properly constrained.  When the plaintiff is local to the forum, the 
state has an interest in providing a forum.  This makes the extracted consent 
to jurisdiction reasonable and provides for at least some litigational
convenience.  But other uses, to allow joinder or to avoid statute of limitations
problems, are untethered to a state interest. In such cases, general jurisdiction 
based on registration should be regarded as invalid. 
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